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Can a food dish have an aesthetic value? This question is what I seek, in this thesis, to 
find an answer to. To respond to the question, in this thesis, I reconstruct and evaluate 
Plato’s answer and Immanuel Kant’s answer on whether a food dish can have an aesthetic 
value. In Chapter I, I reconstruct and evaluate Plato’s answer. In Chapter II, I reconstruct 
and evaluate Kant’s answer. At the two chapters’ endings, after my respective 
examinations of Plato’s answer and Kant’s answer, assuming that the yardstick for 
accepting Plato’s answer and Kant’s answer is the persuasiveness of the accounts leading 
up to their answers for this thesis, I reject both answers on whether a food dish can have 
an aesthetic value. My rejection of both answers means that, as of now and barring other 
thinkers’ answers to the question, whether a food dish can have an aesthetic value 
remains an open question. As I do not think that the rejection of Plato and Kant’s 
respective answers on whether a food dish can have an aesthetic value means that their 
answers are philosophically worthless, in the Conclusion, I briefly state a couple of 
pitfalls, which are drawn from my criticisms of the accounts leading up to their answers, 
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Introduction: Can a Food Dish have an Aesthetic Value? 
Can a food dish have an aesthetic value? This question is what I seek, in this thesis, to 
find an answer to. 
To respond to the question, in this thesis, I reconstruct and evaluate Plato’s answer 
and Immanuel Kant’s answer on whether a food dish can have an aesthetic value.1 In 
Chapter I, I reconstruct and evaluate Plato’s answer.2 In Chapter II, I reconstruct and 
evaluate Kant’s answer.3 
At the two chapters’ endings, after my respective examinations of Plato’s answer and 
Kant’s answer, assuming that the yardstick for accepting Plato’s answer and Kant’s 
answer is the persuasiveness of the accounts leading up to their answers for this thesis, I 
reject both answers on whether a food dish can have an aesthetic value. 
My rejection of both answers means that, as of now and barring other thinkers’ 
answers to the question, whether a food dish can have an aesthetic value remains an open 
question. 
As I do not think that the rejection of Plato and Kant’s respective answers on whether 
a food dish can have an aesthetic value means that their answers are philosophically 
worthless, in the Conclusion, I briefly state a few pitfalls, which are drawn from my 
criticisms of the accounts leading up to their answers, that any view on a food dish’s 
aesthetic value (if any) should avoid to be persuasive.  
 
                                                 
1 I choose to reconstruct Plato’s answer and Kant’s answer for two reasons. Firstly, Plato and Kant have 
similar answers on whether a food dish can have an aesthetic value. Secondly, Plato and Kant argue in a 
similar (but not exactly the same) fashion for their respective answers on whether a food dish can have an 
aesthetic value. 
2 See Chapter I’s beginning for the full details of the chapter’s structure.  
3 See Chapter II’s beginning for the full details of the chapter’s structure.  
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Section 1: The Meanings of Key Terms 
For the rest of this Introduction, I explain the meanings of key terms in the question on 
whether a food dish can have an aesthetic value. 
Section 1.1: The Meaning of “a Food Dish” 
A food dish, as it is commonly understood, may vary in its presentation across places. For 
example, the Sichuan dish Gong Bao Ji Ding , as it is commonly known, may vary in its 
presentation across places; while the Gong Bao Ji Ding may be served as a dish 
complementing other dishes on the dining table in a Chinese family’s home in Sichuan, 
the Gong Bao Ji Ding may be served as a gourmet dish in a wok with gentle flames in an 
upmarket American Chinese restaurant in New York’s Chinatown.  
A food dish, as it is commonly understood, may also vary in its presentation across 
times. For example, the fish burger from the McDonald’s restaurant in Singapore, as it is 
commonly known, has varied in its presentation across times; while the fish burger was 
served as a burger wrapped in a thin sheet of blue coloured paper at this decade’s start, 
the fish burger is served as a burger packaged into a white and blue coloured paper box 
now at the same decade’s end.4 
For this philosophical thesis, I understand a food dish in its essence as a recipe or a 
way in which things are put together. For instance, for this philosophical thesis, I 
understand the Gong Bao Ji Ding as a recipe or a way in which the dish’s ingredients of 
diced chicken, hoisin sauce, peanuts, chilli peppers, and red peppers are put together.  
The meaning of “a recipe” in my understanding of a food dish as a way in which 
things are put together is not equivalent to the same term’s meaning in cookery as a set of 
instructions, which specifies the ingredients and the method to put together those 
                                                 
4 The relevant decade is from 1st January 2000 to 31st December 2009. 
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ingredients to make a food dish. Although the set of instructions in the latter meaning 
points to the way in which things are put together in the former meaning, the two are not 
the same. For instance, although the set of instructions stating the ingredients and the 
method to put together those ingredients to make the Gong Bao Ji Ding indicates the way 
in which the dish’s ingredients are put together, the set of instructions and the way are not 
the same.5 
Also, given my understanding of a food dish as a recipe or a way in which things are 
put together, for this thesis, I largely ignore a food dish’s presentation, which, as a food 
dish is commonly understood, may vary across places and times, and I attend to a food 
dish’s presentation only when it is integral to the food dish’s recipe. For instance, for this 
thesis, assuming that the presentation of the traditional Chinese food Zong Zi in bamboo 
leaves is integral to the food’s recipe, I do not disregard the food’s presentation when I 
talk about the Zong Zi.6 Otherwise, instead of the recipe of the Zong Zi, I talk about 
another recipe.  
Section 1.2: The Meaning of “an Aesthetic Value” 
A food dish, as I understand it in Section 1.1 and for this thesis, can have several values.  
A food dish can have a nutritional value. For example, a bowl of sliced apples has a 
nutritional value because it is, according to the nutritionists, beneficial to our health when 
consumed.  
A food dish can also have a cultural value. For example, the French cuisine, which 
comprises French dishes, has a cultural value because it is, according to Nicolas Sarkozy, 
                                                 
5 To put the example differently, when we think of the Gong Bao Ji Ding, we do not think of the dish as a 
set of instructions stating the ingredients and the method to put together those ingredients to make the dish. 
Instead, we think of the Gong Bao Ji Ding as a way in which the dish’s ingredients of diced chicken, hoisin 
sauce, peanuts, chilli peppers, and red peppers are put together.  
6 The Zong Zi is also often referred to as the “Rice Dumpling.” 
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the current President of the French Republic, and many renowned French chefs, one of 
the French Republic’s greatest achievements.7 
For this philosophical thesis, as said at the Introduction’s start, I focus on a food 
dish’s aesthetic value (if any).  
I use “aesthetics,” which is a variant of “aesthetic” in “a food dish’s aesthetic value,” 
to refer to “the study of aesthetic value and related notions like aesthetic experience, 
aesthetic properties, and aesthetic judgments” (Stecker 2005, p. 2). 
I do not use “aesthetics” to refer to the philosophy of art, which is another discipline 
commonly labelled with the same term. While aesthetics and the philosophy of art 
occasionally overlap, the two disciplines are distinct disciplines. A study in aesthetics 










                                                 
7 These people believe that the French cuisine is “the best gastronomy in the world,” and they are calling 
for the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) to include the French 
cuisine in a listing of the world’s cultural heritage (Bremner 2008, The Times). 
8 The converse is, however, not true. A study in the philosophy of art need involve a study in aesthetics. 
Depending on the view on art, the study of aesthetics can be a major or a minor subject matter in the study 
of the philosophy of art.  
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Chapter I: Plato on Whether a Food Dish can have an Aesthetic Value 
Can a food dish have an aesthetic value? In this chapter, I first reconstruct Plato’s answer 
to the just stated question in Sections 1 to 5, and then I evaluate his answer in Section 6. 
Plato held a synoptic framework of thought with the various parts of his thought 
intimately linked to one another. As such, Plato’s answer on whether a food dish can 
have an aesthetic value has to be derived from not only his aesthetics.  
To arrive at Plato’s answer in Section 5, this chapter goes through Plato’s 
metaphysics in Section 1, Plato’s view on the human biology in Section 2, Plato’s view 
on the human senses in Section 3, and Plato’s aesthetics in Section 4.  
The following diagram shows the links between the various parts of Plato’s thought: 
The explanation for the use of different sorts of line to represent the connections between 
the various Platonic elements in Diagram 1 will be given as the chapter unfolds.  
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Let us begin the reconstruction of Plato’s answer on whether a food dish can have an 
aesthetic value with his metaphysics. 
Section 1: Plato’s Metaphysics 
According to Plato, the human being is “the soul, when encased in a mortal body” 
(Timaeus, p. 82). While the soul is “non-corporeal, rational, [and] immortal,” the body is 
corporeal, irrational or emotional, and mortal (Telfer 1996, p. 33).  
When the soul is first created by the Gods, it is housed in a star. At a human being’s 
birth, however, the soul enters into a body and forgets its divine knowledge. That is why, 
so Plato claims, the “flesh [or body] is an encumbrance to the soul,” and, to recall its 
forgotten divine knowledge or to arrive at true undistorted knowledge, the soul must 
control the body “in the process of learning, which, ideally but rarely, culminates in 
apprehension of the eternal Forms” (Korsmeyer 1999, p. 13).9    
As it has been presented thus far, Plato’s account of the human being appears 
bipartite with the human being as “a battleground between the rational, on the one hand, 
and the irrational or ‘bodily’ on the other” (Rowe 1997, p. 433). Plato’s account of the 
human being is actually tripartite.  
As Plato tells us, upon the soul’s entering into a body, the embodied soul somehow 
divides itself into three parts—one rational part, i.e. reason, and two irrational parts, i.e. 
spirit and appetite. On the embodied soul’s rational side, reason, being “the reflective 
element in the mind,” is exactly the rational immortal soul described awhile ago and 
                                                 
9 For Plato, “ultimate reality is the non-material realm of the Forms or essences of things, which are 
universal and eternal; the everyday world is only half-real, not truly existing, ‘becoming’: in other words it 
is constantly changing and decaying, and possesses no characteristics except in a qualified way” (Telfer 
1996, pp. 33—34). The everyday world is only half-real and only possesses characteristics in a qualified 
way because its reality and characteristics are derived from (albeit distortedly due to the body as a 
hindrance) and dependent on the realm of the Forms. 
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governs over the embodied soul’s irrational parts (The Republic, 439d, p. 147). On the 
embodied soul’s irrational side, while spirit, being reason’s “natural auxiliary” or ally, is 
inclined to “take up arms for reason” and to aid reason in controlling appetite, appetite, 
being “the element with which [the embodied soul] feels hunger and thirst, and the 
agitations of sex and other desires,” is “closely connected with satisfaction and pleasure” 
of the bodily sort (The Republic, 439d, p. 147; 441a, p. 149).10  
                                                 
10 In an ingenious moment, Plato himself conjured up an image to make clear his tripartite model of the 
embodied soul.  
In The Republic, Plato likens the embodied soul’s three parts of reason, spirit, and appetite respectively 
to “a man,” “a lion,” and “a many-headed beast, with heads of wild and tame animals all round it, which it 
can produce and change at will” (The Republic, 588c—588d, pp. 330—331). For an illustration of Plato’s 
image, see Diagram 2: 
 
 
As Plato sketches his image, he describes the relationship between reason and appetite as one where “the 
man... look[s] after the many-headed beast like a farmer, nursing and cultivating its tamer elements and 
preventing the wilder ones growing,” and he describes the relationship between reason and spirit as one in 
which “he [i.e. the man] makes an ally of the lion” (The Republic, 589a—589b, p. 331).  
As Plato continues to sketch his image, he says that reason must be in command and “look[ ] after the 
common interests of all [the embodied soul’s parts] by reconciling them with each other and with [it]self” 
(The Republic, 589a—589b, p. 331). Otherwise, “either of the lower [or irrational] parts may dominate and 
distort the reasoning part and its judgements” (Rowe 1997, p. 434). 
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As Plato continues to tell us, upon the human being’s death, while reason is released 
from its present embodiment to rejoin the realm of the Forms and/or be reincarnated, 
spirit and appetite die with the body.11 This claim about what happens on the human 
being’s death is why I used the undotted lines to draw the connection between the human 
being as the rational soul and reason, and why I used the dotted lines to draw the 
connections between the human being as an embodied soul and reason, spirit, and 
appetite in Diagram 1.  
Plato’s tripartite model of the embodied soul, as described above, paints a certain 
picture of the relationships between the embodied soul’s three parts. Firstly, given that 
reason is immortal and governs over both spirit and appetite, reason is seen as superior to 
both spirit and appetite. Secondly, given that spirit helps reason in controlling appetite 
but nevertheless dies with appetite on the human being’s death, spirit is viewed as 
superior to appetite but inferior to reason. Thirdly, given that appetite is mortal, closely 
connected with bodily pleasures, and needs to be controlled by reason with spirit’s 
assistance, appetite is regarded as inferior to both reason and spirit. 
In short, Plato’s tripartite model of the embodied soul presents reason and appetite 
respectively as the most superior and most inferior parts with spirit somewhere between 
those two parts (but closer to reason) in terms of hierarchy. 
As we shall see next, Plato translates these hierarchical relationships between the 
embodied soul’s three parts into his view on the human biology. 
                                                 
11 According to Plato’s theory of reincarnation, whether and how reason or the rational immortal soul gets 
reincarnated on the human being’s death depends on whether the human being has lived her life well. 
Presumably then, for the Gods to judge whether the human being has lived her life well and to decide 
whether and how reason gets reincarnated on the human being’s death, the human being is required to live 
for a fair amount of time. Plato’s theory of reincarnation is not without its problems. For this thesis, 
however, I ignore those problems. 
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Section 2: Plato’s View on the Human Biology 
According to Plato, the Gods recognise the hierarchical relationships between the 
embodied soul’s three parts and fashioned the human body such that reason’s location in 
the body is kept at a safe distance from and presides over spirit and appetite’s respective 
locations in the body. 
As Plato tells us, and with reference to Diagram 3, reason “occupies the top floor of 
the body—the head” whereas spirit “resides in the thorax and stands guard there on 
behalf of the intellect [or reason] against the appetites, seated in the lower part of the 
midriff” (Korsmeyer 1999, p. 13). 
 
As Plato continues to tell us, while the head, being “the dwelling-place of the most 
sacred and divine part of us [i.e. reason]” with its face “inserted [with] organs to minister 
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in all things to the providence of the soul,”  is “the lord” which governs over the rest of 
the human body, both the thorax, which houses “that part of the inferior soul [i.e. spirit] 
which is endowed with courage and passion... and [which] might join with it [i.e. reason] 
in controlling and restraining the [appetite’s] desires,” and the midriff, which houses 
appetite that “would not comprehend reason, and even if attaining to some degree of 
perception would never naturally care for rational notions, but that it would be led away 
by phantoms and visions night and day,” are the head’s “servants” (Timaeus, pp. 83—
100). The thorax, whose organs like “the heart, the knot of the veins and the fountain of 
the blood which races through all the limbs,” and “the lung,” are used to aid reason in 
controlling appetite is, however, the better servant compared to the midriff, whose organ 
of the stomach is used solely as “a sort of manger” for “bound[ing] [ ] down” and 
“chain[ing] up” appetite (Timaeus, pp. 99—100).  
Plato’s account of the human biology, as described above, paints a picture of the 
relationships between the human body’s different portions that is similar to the picture of 
the relationships between the embodied soul’s three parts in Section 1. Firstly, given that 
the head houses reason and governs over the rest of the human body, the head is seen as 
superior to both the thorax and the midriff. Secondly, given that the thorax houses spirit 
which helps reason in the head to control appetite in the midriff but is nevertheless a 
servant to the head, the thorax is viewed as superior to the midriff but inferior to the head.  
 
 11
Thirdly, given that the midriff houses appetite which is markedly opposed to reason with 
its concern for bodily pleasures and needs to be controlled by the head with the thorax’s 
assistance, the midriff is regarded as inferior to both the head and the thorax.12 
In short, Plato’s account of the human biology presents the head, which houses reason, 
and the midriff, which houses appetite, respectively as the most superior and most 
inferior portions of the human body with the thorax, which houses spirit, somewhere 
between those two portions in terms of hierarchy (and, not by coincidence as explained 
earlier, location in the body). The translation of the hierarchical relationships between the 
embodied soul’s three parts into his view on the human biology is, however, not enough 
for Plato.  
As we shall see next, Plato continues to translate these hierarchical relationships into 
his view on the human senses.  
 
                                                 
12 In another ingenious moment, Plato himself conjured up an image to support the hierarchical relationship 
between, on the inferior side, appetite and the midriff, and, on the superior side, reason and the head.  
In Timaeus, Plato describes appetite and the stomach (the midriff’s organ) as follows:        
 
The part of the soul which desires meats and drinks and the other things of which it has need by reason 
of the bodily nature, they [the Gods] placed between the midriff and the boundary of the navel, 
contriving in all this region a sort of manger for the food of the body; and there they bound it down 
like a wild animal which was chained up with man, and must be nourished if man was to exist. They 
appointed this lower creation his place here in order that he might be always feeding at the manger, 
and have his dwelling as far as might be from the council-chamber [i.e. the head], making as little 
noise and disturbance as possible, and permitting the best part [i.e. reason] to advise quietly for the 
good of the whole. (Timaeus, p. 100) 
 
In the just quoted passage, Plato compares appetite to an imprisoned wild animal and the stomach to a 
manger where appetite is confined. In the same passage, while Plato acknowledges the role which appetite 
and the stomach play in ensuring the human being’s survival, he nevertheless casts an inferior light on that 
role with a twofold meaning of the word “man” in the phrase “there they bound it down like a wild animal 
which was chained up with man, and must be nourished if man was to exist.” As one commentator 
highlights to us, “while it is a man—a human being—who is being analyzed in toto... in the passage it is 
also ‘man’ in a narrower sense” which “alludes to the person’s distinctively human qualities of rationality 
[or, as I would put it, reason]” (Korsmeyer 1999, p. 14). Although reason is immortal and survives the 
human being’s death, perhaps due to his theory of reincarnation, Plato wants reason to remain embodied in 
the head for a fair amount of time. (For a brief explanation of Plato’s theory of reincarnation, see note 11.) 
This implies that the “man” in toto, which includes appetite in the midriff (and spirit in the thorax), is 
nourished insofar as reason needs its head to be nourished for its continued embodiment.  
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Section 3: Plato’s View on the Human Senses 
According to Plato, besides fashioning the human body in a way which preserves the 
hierarchical relationships between the embodied soul’s three parts, the Gods also 
designed the five human senses to maintain those hierarchical relationships. 
The Gods, so Plato claims, split the five human senses into two main groups. While 
sight and hearing are classified under the group labelled as “the higher senses,” smell, 
touch, and taste are categorised under the group labelled as “the lower senses.”13  
Our immediate query is how each sense is identified as either a higher sense or a 
lower sense. 
As Plato answers our immediate query, the most basic criterion for identifying a sense 
as either a higher sense or a lower sense is the distance between the sense’s organ of 
perception and its object of perception in the sense’s operation. A higher sense is one 
with maximal distance between its organ and object of perception in its operation, and a 
lower sense is one with minimal distance between its organ and object of perception in its 
operation.  
As Plato continues to answer our query, the distance between the sense’s organ and 
object of perception stands not only for the extent of space between the organ and the 
object, but also refers to the human body’s apparent involvement in the sense’s operation. 
To put it in correlative terms: The further (closer) the organ is from the object, the lower 
(higher) the degree of apparent bodily involvement in the sense’s operation. To Plato, as 
with “virtually all analyses of the senses in Western philosophy,” the distance between 
the organ and object of perception is seen “as a cognitive, moral, and aesthetic 
                                                 
13 The higher senses are also often referred to as “the cognitive senses” or “the distance senses,” and the 
lower senses are also often referred to as “the bodily senses” or “the contact senses.” 
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advantage” (Korsmeyer 1999, p. 12). The explanation is that the distance “fosters the 
impression of the separation of the mind [or, as I would put it, reason] from body and the 
potential freedom of mind [or reason] to explore worlds of intellect and diviner regions 
where bodies cannot travel” (Korsmeyer 1999, p. 17). 
As Plato’s most basic criterion for identifying a sense as either a higher sense or a 
lower sense has just been elaborated, the result of applying that criterion to the senses is a 
hierarchy where the higher senses are considered as superior to the lower senses. This is 
so because, firstly, the higher senses, in virtue of the maximal distance between their 
organs and objects of perception, prompt the human being to transcend its present 
embodiment and to aspire towards the realm of the Forms, and, secondly, the lower 
senses, in virtue of the minimal distance between their organs and objects of perception, 
entice the human being to yield to its irrational parts and not to transcend its present 
embodiment. 
The hierarchical relationships between the higher and lower senses maintain the 
hierarchical relationships between the embodied soul’s three parts. In what follows, Plato 
further reveals the connections between the former relationships and the latter 
relationships in his respective descriptions of the five human senses.  
Section 3.1: Plato’s Description of Sight 
Amongst all the senses, Plato lauds the sense of sight most.  
To indicate sight’s superiority over all the other senses (and especially the lower 
senses), Plato first links sight with the head by saying that the eyes, sight’s organs, are 
“the organs they [i.e. the Gods] first contrived” in the head to aid reason in its workings 
(Timaeus, p. 83).  
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To establish sight as a higher sense and the most superior higher sense, Plato then 
applies his most basic criterion for identifying a sense as either a higher sense or a lower 
sense to sight. He writes:  
 
The sight in my opinion is the source of the greatest benefit to us, for had we never 
seen the stars, and the sun, and the heaven, none of the words which we have spoken 
about the universe would ever have been uttered. But now the sight of day and night, 
and the months and the revolutions of the years, have created number, and have given 
us a conception of time, and the power of enquiring about the nature of the universe; 
and from this source we have derived philosophy, than which no greater good ever 
was or will be given by the gods to mortal man. (Timaeus, p. 84) 
 
In the just quoted passage, Plato can be said to be establishing sight as a higher sense by 
applying his most basic criterion to sight. For if “the stars, and the sun, and the heaven” 
are sight’s typical objects of perception, then there is a great distance between the eyes 
and their objects of perception in sight’s operation. And if there is a great distance 
between the eyes and their objects in sight’s operation, then sight (more than) passes 
Plato’s most basic criterion and earns its place amongst the higher senses. 
In the same passage, Plato can also be said to be establishing sight as the most 
superior higher sense by associating sight with philosophy, the best mortal good. For if 
sight is “the source of the greatest benefit to us” from which “we have derived 
philosophy, than which no greater good ever was or will be given by the gods to mortal 
man,” and philosophy is regarded as the love of knowledge, then sight must be the higher 
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sense best suited to aid reason in its quest for true undistorted knowledge and for aspiring 
towards the realm of the Forms. 
That sight is the most superior higher sense, and, by implication, the most superior 
sense amongst all the senses, however, does not mean that sight is free from error in its 
operation. As Plato himself acknowledges, sight, just like the other senses, may be 
erroneous in its operation by producing illusions. 14  For example, in “moonlight or 
starlight,” sight may produce illusions because the eyes “see dimly and appear to be 
almost blind, as if they had no clear vision” (The Republic, 508c, p. 233). 
Despite that acknowledgement, Plato retains his insistence on sight as the most 
superior sense amongst all the senses. He puts forth two further claims to support his just 
stated insistence. 
One, Plato claims that “visual experience is distinct from the experience that involves 
a change of bodily state, as is the case with the contact senses of taste and touch” 
(Korsmeyer 1999, p. 17). For instance, upon coming into contact with a warm towel, 
while our eyes are unaffected by the image of the warm towel (a visual experience), our 
bare hands turn warm when they touch the warm towel (a tactile experience). This claim 
is just another manifestation of Plato’s most basic criterion for identifying a sense as 
either a higher sense or a lower sense.  
Two, Plato claims that sight “bring[s] sensations to the mind [or, as I would put it, the 
head], the seat of intellect, whereas the other senses convey their information to the lower 
portions of the body” (Korsmeyer 1999, p. 17). This claim is dissimilar to the preceding 
paragraph’s claim. While the preceding paragraph’s claim is just another manifestation of 
                                                 
14 These illusions are deceiving or misleading images of “reality.” “Reality” is in parenthesis because 
reality, as perceived by the human senses, is only half-real. Ultimate reality, to Plato, is the realm of the 
Forms. (For a brief explanation of Plato’s ultimate reality, see note 9.) 
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Plato’s most basic criterion, this claim draws a connection between sight and reason by 
telling us that sight conveys its pieces of information directly to reason. 
Section 3.2: Plato’s Description of Hearing 
Besides sight, Plato also regards hearing as a higher sense.15  
Plato talks about hearing (and its related activity of speech) in the following passage: 
 
The same [as what has been said about sight] may be affirmed of speech and hearing: 
they have been given by the gods to the same end and for a like reason... Moreover, 
so much of music as is adapted to the sound of the voice and to the sense of hearing is 
granted to us for the sake of harmony; and harmony, which has motions akin to the 
revolutions of our souls, is not regarded by the intelligent votary of the Muses as 
given by them with a view to irrational pleasure, which is deemed to be the purpose 
of it in our day, but as meant to correct any discord which may have arisen in the 
courses of the soul, and to be our ally in bringing her into harmony and agreement 
with herself; and rhythm too was given by them for the same reason, on account of 
the irregular and graceless ways which prevail among mankind generally, and to help 
us against them. (Timaeus, pp. 84—85) 
 
As Plato tells us in the passage’s first line, hearing and sight are the same in terms of 
being reason’s aid in its quest for true undistorted knowledge and for aspiring towards the 
realm of the Forms. 
                                                 
15 Unlike his lengthy discussion on sight, however, Plato’s treatment of hearing is short and appears to be 
an extension of his discussion on sight. 
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As Plato continues to tell us in the rest of the passage, hearing is an “ally” of reason 
or suited to aid reason because the “harmony” and the “rhythm” found in music, 
hearing’s object of perception, help to cultivate the right sort of relationships between the 
embodied soul’s three parts. The right sort of relationships between the embodied soul’s 
three parts, we recall from Section 1, is one where reason governs over spirit and appetite. 
As hearing has been presented thus far, Plato considers hearing, as with sight, to be 
superior to the lower senses. Juxtaposed with sight alone, however, Plato sees hearing as 
inferior to sight. 
Plato sees hearing as inferior to sight for a couple of reasons. Firstly, as elaborated in 
Section 3.1, Plato establishes sight as the most superior higher sense. This 
straightforwardly implies that hearing, although a higher sense and superior to the lower 
senses, is inferior to sight. Secondly, building on the claim elaborated towards the end of 
Section 3.1 about sight conveying its pieces of information directly to reason in the head 
whereas the other senses convey their pieces of information to the human body’s lower 
portions, Plato tells us that hearing’s “vibration” or conveyance of information “ends in 
the region of the liver,” which is located at the midriff (Timaeus, p. 97). This means that 
hearing do not share sight’s connection with reason, and is hence inferior to sight.16   
Section 3.3: Plato’s Description of Taste 
Amongst the lower senses, Plato talks about taste most.17  
To indicate taste’s inferiority to all the other senses except touch, Plato first removes 
any idea of some link between taste and reason due to the position of the tongue, taste’s 
                                                 
16 Although Plato writes positively about the liver, where hearing’s conveyance of information ends, as “a 
remedy” for quietening appetite in the stomach, he nevertheless discounts that fact in the consideration of 
hearing’s status in relation to sight (Timaeus, p. 100). The just mentioned discount probably stems from 
Plato’s discomfort with the liver being located so close to the stomach, which is appetite’s home.   
17 Unlike his lengthy eulogy of sight, however, Plato’s discussion of taste is a long dyslogy.  
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organ, in the head by the Gods by explaining away the tongue’s inappropriate position. 
Plato can be said to be explaining away the tongue’s inappropriate position in the 
following passage:    
 
In the first place let us set forth what was omitted when we were speaking of juices, 
concerning the affections peculiar to the tongue. These too, like most of the other 
affections, appear to be caused by certain contractions and dilations, but they have 
besides more of roughness and smoothness than is found in other affections; for 
whenever earthy particles enter into the small veins which are the testing instruments 
of the tongue, reaching to the heart, and fall upon the moist, delicate portions of 
flesh... (Timaeus, p. 96) 
 
According to one commentator, in the just quoted passage, “Plato is probably speculating 
about the visible papillae on the tongue when he observes that when food is taken into the 
mouth, it dissolves and penetrates the ‘small veins which are the testing instruments of 
the tongue,’ making its effects felt by dilations and contractions of these veins or ducts” 
(Korsmeyer 1999, p. 13).  
According to the same commentator, Plato’s speculation about the tongue’s visible 
papillae suggests that the dissolved food particles “do not remain in the diviner residence 
of the head, nor do they have their principal effects on the intellectual soul [i.e. reason]” 
(Korsmeyer 1999, p. 14). Rather, they “make their way through the veins of the tongue to 
the heart” (ibid.). And as hinted by the claim about the stomach being a manger for 
confining appetite in Section 2, the dissolved food particles ultimately wind up with 
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appetite, which is “the part of the soul which desires meats and drinks,” in the stomach 
(Timaeus, p. 100).  
To establish taste’s inferiority to all the other senses except touch, Plato then directly 
connects taste with appetite by declaring the tongue as made by the Gods to be “solely of 
flesh in order to give sensation [or bodily pleasures],” which is appetite’s concern as said 
in Section 1 (Timaeus, p. 103).18  
Section 3.4: Plato’s Description of Touch 
Besides taste, Plato also regards touch as a lower sense.19 
To Plato, touch, as with taste, is inferior to all the other senses. This is so for a couple 
of reasons.  
Firstly, touch, just like taste, fails (quite dramatically) Plato’s most basic criterion for 
identifying a sense as either a higher sense or a lower sense. When touch is operating, 
there is a minimal and almost negligible distance between the skin, touch’s organ, and its 
object, and there is a change of bodily state. For example, upon coming into contact with 
a piece of ice, our skin touches the ice with negligible distance between itself and the ice, 
and our skin becomes cold. 
Secondly, touch, just like taste, has a close connection with appetite. Building again 
on the claim elaborated towards the end of Section 3.1 about sight conveying its pieces of 
information directly to reason in the head whereas the other senses convey their pieces of 
information to the human body’s lower portions, Plato tells us that both touch and taste 
convey their pieces of information to appetite in the stomach. 
 
                                                 
18 To Plato, body parts which “have mind [or reason] in them are in general less fleshy” (Timaeus, p. 103).  
19 Similar to his treatment of hearing in relation to his discussion on sight, Plato’s treatment of touch is brief 
and appears to be an extension of his discussion on taste. 
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Section 3.5: Plato’s Description of Smell 
Besides taste and touch, Plato also regards smell as a lower sense. 
However, in terms of hierarchy, Plato considers smell as situated between the higher 
senses and the other lower senses. This is so because, building yet again on the claim 
elaborated towards the end of Section 3.1 about sight conveying its pieces of information 
directly to reason in the head whereas the other senses convey their pieces of information 
to the human body’s lower portions, Plato declares that smell conveys its pieces of 
information to spirit in “the whole cavity which is situated between the head and the 
navel,” i.e. the thorax (Timaeus, p. 97). As we have learnt from Sections 1 and 2, for 
Plato, spirit in the thorax is viewed as superior to appetite in the midriff but inferior to 
reason in the head. This explains smell’s hierarchical location.20 
Our immediate query is why smell is not regarded as a higher sense, when smell is 
similar to hearing in terms of conveyance of information to a body part other than the 
head which aids reason in managing appetite, and when hearing is regarded as a higher 
sense. 
Plato has no answer to our immediate query in his texts. However, we can imagine 
Plato invoking his most basic criterion for identifying a sense as either a higher sense or a 
lower sense to respond to our query. 
As Plato may respond to our query, smell is a lower sense because, unlike hearing, 
smell fails his most basic criterion for identifying a sense as either a higher sense or a 
lower sense. Smell fails his basic criterion because, when smell is operating, firstly, there 
is a “fairly close” distance between the nose, smell’s organ, and its object, and, secondly, 
                                                 
20 Also, similar to Plato’s explaining away of the tongue’s inappropriate position in the head in Section 3.3, 
this removes any idea of some link between smell and reason due to the position of the nose, smell’s organ, 
in the head by the Gods. 
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there may be a change of bodily state (Korsmeyer 1999, p. 12). For instance, to examine 
a flower with a pungent scent, the nose has to be near the flower to sniff its scent, and the 
nostrils may twitch and cause a sneeze to erupt from the nose. Hearing, on the other hand, 
passes Plato’s basic criterion because, when hearing is operating, there is a considerable 
distance between the ears and their object, and there is no apparent change of bodily state.   
Section 3.6: The Hierarchy of the Human Senses 
To summarise Section 3 as a whole, Plato’s view on the human senses is hierarchical and 
maintains the hierarchical relationships between the embodied soul’s three parts. 
      With reference to Diagram 4, Plato’s view presents the higher senses, which are 
associated (albeit in different ways) with reason in the head, as superior to the lower 
senses, which are linked to either spirit in the thorax or appetite in the midriff. 
Specifically, it presents sight as the most superior sense amongst the five senses, hearing 
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as inferior to sight but superior to the lower senses, smell as inferior to the higher senses 
but superior to its fellow lower senses, and touch and taste as the most inferior senses 
amongst the five senses. 
The translations of the hierarchical relationships between the embodied soul’s three 
parts into his views on the human biology and the human senses are, however, still not 
enough for Plato. As we shall see next, Plato goes on to translate these hierarchical 
relationships into his aesthetics. Plato’s aesthetics, as said at this chapter’s beginning, is 
also the last section in the reconstruction of Plato’s answer on whether a food dish can 
have an aesthetic value.  
Section 4: Plato’s Aesthetics 
According to Plato, not all of the five senses’ objects of perception can be beautiful or 
have an aesthetic value.21 
Plato can be said to be telling us what objects can be beautiful in the following two 
passages:  
 
If whatever makes us glad, not with all the pleasures, but just those through hearing 
and sight—if we call that fine, how do you suppose we’d do in the contest? 
                                                 
21 A caveat on Plato’s aesthetical terms: Plato’s aesthetical terms, to kalon and auto to kalon, are “phrases 
traditionally rendered [respectively] as ‘the beautiful’ or ‘beauty,’ [and] ‘the beautiful itself’ or ‘beauty 
itself’” (Janaway 1995, p. 59). Some scholars, however, translate kalos, those terms’ root word, as “noble,” 
“admirable,” or “fine.” They claim that kalos is actually “a quite general term of commendation in Greek,” 
and that “the aesthetic quality which we call ‘beauty’ is [really only] one aspect of [what Plato calls] 
fineness, although it is not always separately noticed or valued” (Woodruff 1982, p. 110; Janaway 1995, p. 
59). From that claim, they then go on to argue that the translation of kalos as “beauty” restricts the “great 
range” of kalos with regard to what it may be used to describe and the meanings it may evoke when used 
(Woodruff 1982, p. 110). Nevertheless, for this chapter’s purposes, unless otherwise stated, we may ignore 
what these scholars say and treat “beautiful” and “fine” as synonymous words.  
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Men [i.e. people: anthrōpoi] when they’re fine anyway—and everything 
decorative, pictures and sculptures—these all delight us when we see them, if they’re 
fine. Fine sounds and music altogether, and speeches and storytelling have the same 
effect. (Hippias Major, 297e5—298a5) 
 
anyone in the world would laugh at us if we called it [food and drink] not pleasant to 
eat but fine, or if we called a pleasant smell not pleasant but fine. And as for making 
love [ta peri ta aphrodisia], everybody would fight us; they’d say it is most pleasant, 
but that one should do it, if he does it at all, where no one will see, because it is the 
foulest thing to be seen. (Hippias Major, 299a1—299a6) 
 
As the just quoted passages indicate, Plato “think[s] of the objects of the cognitive senses 
as those that also may be beautiful,” and he thinks of the “objects of the bodily senses [as 
not beautiful but may be] at best pleasant or sensuously enjoyable, even in their most 
sophisticated and refined forms [such as a fragrant scent]” (Korsmeyer 1999, p. 26).  
As the same passages indicate too, Plato also regards “the pleasure that ‘we enjoy 
through our sense[s] of hearing and sight’ [i.e. the higher senses]” as pleasures that may 
be beautiful, and he regards “the pleasure derived from the other senses [i.e. the lower 
senses] [as] not beautiful” but may be at best sensuously enjoyable (Sider 1977, p. 469). 
Our immediate query is why Plato considers the higher senses’ objects and their 
derivative pleasures as things that may be beautiful, and why he considers the lower 
senses’ objects and their derivative pleasures as not beautiful but may be at best 
sensuously enjoyable. 
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As Plato answers our immediate query based on his metaphysics and his views on the 
human biology and the human senses in Sections 1 to 3, the higher senses’ objects and 
their derivative pleasures may be beautiful because they are respectively constituted of 
and the result of the higher senses’ operations, which happen in the body parts associated 
with reason. That is why the higher senses’ objects, such as “pictures and sculptures,” 
“fine sounds and music altogether, and speeches and storytelling,” and their derivative 
pleasures may also be seen as aids which prompt the human being to transcend its present 
embodiment and to aspire towards the realm of the Forms (Hippias Major, 297e5—
298a5). 
As Plato continues to answer our query based on his metaphysics and his views on 
the human biology and the human senses in Sections 1 to 3, the lower senses’ objects and 
their derivative pleasures are not beautiful but may be at best sensuously enjoyable 
because they are respectively constituted of and the result of the lower senses’ operations, 
which happen in the body parts associated with spirit and especially appetite. That is why 
the lower senses’ objects, such as “food and drink” and “sex,” and their derivative 
pleasures may also be seen as hindrances which entice the human being to yield to its 







Plato’s aesthetics, as described above, presents the beauty of the higher senses’ 
objects and their derivative pleasures as superior to the sensuous enjoyment of the lower 
senses’ objects and their derivative pleasures.22 The hierarchical relationship between the 
beauty of the higher senses’ objects and their derivative pleasures and the sensuous 
enjoyment of the lower senses’ objects and their derivative pleasures preserves the 
hierarchical relationships between the embodied soul’s three parts. 
Section 5: Plato’s Answer on Whether a Food Dish can have an Aesthetic Value 
Can a food dish have an aesthetic value? This question was posed hypothetically to Plato 
at this chapter’s beginning. 
                                                 
22 Plato can also be said to be establishing the superiority of the beauty of the higher senses’ objects and 
their derivative pleasures over the sensuous enjoyment of the lower senses’ objects and their derivative 
pleasures in the following passage: 
 
The man who has been guided thus far in the mysteries of love, and who has directed his thoughts 
towards examples of beauty in due and orderly succession, will suddenly have revealed to him as he 
approaches the end of his initiation a beauty whose nature is marvellous indeed, the final goal, Socrates, 
of all his previous efforts. This beauty is first of all eternal; it neither comes into being nor passes away, 
neither waxes not wanes; next, it is not beautiful in part and ugly in part, nor beautiful at one time and 
ugly at another, nor beautiful in this relation and ugly in that, nor beautiful here and ugly there, as 
varying according to its beholders; nor again will this beauty appear to him like the beauty of a face or 
hands or anything else corporeal, or like the beauty of a thought or a science, or like beauty which has 
its seat in something other than itself, be it a living thing or the earth or the sky or anything else 
whatever; he will see it as absolute, existing alone with itself, unique, eternal, and all other beautiful 
things as partaking of it, yet in such a manner that, while they come into being and pass away, it 
neither undergoes any increase or diminution nor suffers any change. (Symposium, 210e2—211b5) 
 
In the passage, Plato suggests to us how auto to kalon, or the beautiful itself, should be conceived. The 
beautiful itself should be thought of as “single, eternal and unchanging, dependent on nothing for its 
existence, and distinct from any particular thing (or class of things) that is kalos” (Janaway 1995, p. 77). 
Despite it being distinct from any particular thing that is kalos or any beautiful thing, however, the beautiful 
itself, just like any beautiful thing, “must itself, supremely, be beautiful to contemplate” (Price 1989, p. 43, 
n. 49). This means that “the beautiful itself (arguably) has to measured on the same scale as familiar 
beautiful things, and be superior to them in value on that scale” (Janaway 1995, p. 77). Juxtaposed with the 
beautiful itself, the beauty of the higher senses’ objects and their derivative pleasures appears less superior. 
This is so because, unlike the beautiful itself, that beauty is not eternal and unchanging. Just like the 
sensuous enjoyment of the lower senses’ objects and their derivative pleasures, that beauty “occup[ies] the 
physical world of appearance” and disappears with the human being’s death (Korsmeyer 1999, p. 18). 
Nevertheless, the “participat[ion]” of that beauty in the same scale as the beautiful itself indicates its 
superiority over the sensuous enjoyment of the lower senses’ objects and their derivative pleasures (Phaedo, 
100c, p. 56). 
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As Plato would answer the question based on his metaphysics, his views on the 
human biology and the human senses, and his aesthetics in Sections 1 to 4, “no, a food 
dish cannot have an aesthetic value.” This is so because, to Plato, a food dish, being an 
object of the lower senses, which are linked with the body parts that are in turn associated 
with spirit and especially appetite, cannot be beautiful but can be at best sensuously 
enjoyable. 
As Plato would add to his answer based on his metaphysics, his views on the human 
biology and the human senses, and his aesthetics in Sections 1 to 4, “not only is it the 
case that a food dish cannot have an aesthetic value, it can have an aesthetic disvalue.” 
This is so because, to Plato, a food dish and its derivative pleasures, as with all the other 
lower senses’ objects and their derivative pleasures, can be seen as hindrances which 
entice the human being to yield to its irrational parts and not to transcend its present 
embodiment. 
To accentuate the aesthetic disvalue of a food dish and its derivative pleasures, Plato 
puts forth two extra arguments—a “quantitative” argument and a “qualitative” 
argument—against the pleasures of eating and (the related and/or similar activity of) 
drinking (Telfer 1996, pp. 24—25).23 While the quantitative argument “maintains that the 
amount of pleasure produced by eating and drinking is not as great as it seems,” the 
qualitative argument “maintains that the kind of pleasure to be got from eating and 
drinking is less worthwhile than the kind that is to be got from other pursuits” (ibid.).  
In the quantitative argument, Plato “portrays the pleasures of eating and drinking as a 
kind of addiction” and “claims that seeking pleasure from food is self-defeating” (Telfer 
                                                 
23 The two arguments are “extra” in two senses. One, they are “extra” in the sense that they are on top of 
the general arguments against the lower senses’ objects and their derivative pleasures. Two, they are 
“extra” in the sense that they are largely independent of those general arguments. 
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1996, p. 27). Like the man seeking for “wine,” “honey,” and “milk” with “vessels [that] 
are leaky and rotten,” and who “is forced to be always filling them day and night, or else 
he suffers the most extreme distresses,” someone who seeks pleasure from food “is never 
satisfied, and gets less pleasure each time” (Gorgias, 493d—494b, pp. 67—68; Telfer 
1996, p. 27).  
In the qualitative argument, Plato “argues that many so-called pleasures, among them 
the pleasures of eating and drinking, are not genuine pleasures at all, but only reliefs from 
pain which we mistake for pleasure” (Telfer 1996, p. 32). He claims that when a hungry 
man “replenish[es] his body with food,” such as “bread, meat and drink,” he mistakes 
“the transition from pain [of being hungry] to the neutral state” as one which “brings 
satisfaction and pleasure” (The Republic, 585a, p. 326). To Plato, “the only genuine 
pleasures are those which do not depend, as the pleasures of eating do, on a previous 
desire” (Telfer 1996, p. 32). 
Section 6: Evaluation of Plato’s Answer 
“Not only is it the case that a food dish cannot have an aesthetic value, it can have an 
aesthetic disvalue.” This is Plato’s answer to the question on whether a food dish can 
have an aesthetic value. 
Our immediate concern is whether we should accept Plato’s answer on whether a 
food dish can have an aesthetic value. Assuming that the yardstick for accepting Plato’s 
answer is the persuasiveness of the account leading up to his answer for this thesis, I 
suggest that we should reject Plato’s answer because the account leading up to his answer 
is unconvincing. 
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In what follows, I concentrate on and argue against four philosophically contentious 
points made in the account leading up to Plato’s answer on whether a food dish can have 
an aesthetic value.24   
Section 6.1: The First Philosophically Contentious Point 
The first philosophically contentious point made in the account leading up to Plato’s 
answer on whether a food dish can have an aesthetic value that I would like to examine is 
Plato’s quantitative argument in Section 5.25 
In reply to Plato’s quantitative argument, Elizabeth Telfer points out to us that “the 
phrase [‘never finally satisfied’] is ambiguous: it can mean either that they [eaters] never 
really enjoy their food or that they never feel they have had enough” (Telfer 1996, p. 27). 
As Telfer continues to point out to us, different kinds of eater, instead of all eaters, are 
tagged with either the former meaning or the latter meaning of “never finally satisfied.” 
                                                 
24 A caveat about what I am going to do: For the four philosophically contentious points that I focus on and 
argue against in what follows, I mostly leave aside the empirically contentious claims made in them to the 
relevant experts. I address the empirically contentious claims only when it is necessary, i.e. only when any 
of these claims have a strong bearing on any of the philosophically contentious points.     
25 Since it is still fresh in our minds given the proximity with which it has been introduced, I shall not 
summarise Plato’s quantitative argument here. See Section 5 for the details of the quantitative argument. 
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With reference to Diagram 5, Telfer identifies four kinds of eater, namely, the normal 
eaters, the gluttons, the epicures, and the addicts. According to Telfer, the normal eaters 
are eaters “who are temporarily satisfied but soon want to eat again,” the gluttons are 
eaters “who always want to be eating but who enjoy their food,” the epicures are eaters 
“who have to have something out of the ordinary before they can enjoy what they eat,” 
and the addicts are eaters “who feel compelled to eat or drink more and more, but do not 
enjoy it” (Telfer 1996, p. 27). 
As Telfer says to us, while the epicures and the addicts are tagged with the meaning 
of “never finally satisfied” as never really enjoy their food, the normal eaters and the 
gluttons are tagged with the meaning of “never finally satisfied” as never feel they have 
had enough.  
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As Telfer continues to say to us, unlike the epicures and the addicts “for whom the 
pleasures of eating and drinking constantly diminish,” “both gluttons and normal eaters 
(most of us, [she] assume[s]) continue to get pleasure from their food” (Telfer 1996, p. 
27). Assuming that most of us are indeed normal eaters and gluttons, then “the fact that 
our desire for food is never finally satisfied does not mean that food produces less 
pleasure than we think” (ibid.). Rather, “the constantly renewed desire for food is a 
positive advantage from the point of view of quantity of pleasure, and the fact that we can 
temporarily have enough a disadvantage” (ibid.). 
I agree largely with Telfer’s reply to Plato’s quantitative argument. Given the 2008 
Food Addicts Census report of a total number of 3636 food addicts vis-à-vis the millions 
of non-food addicts worldwide, her assumption that most of us are normal eaters and 
gluttons is empirically safe (2008 Food Addicts Census, p. 2). 
Despite my general agreement with Telfer, however, I disagree with her 
characterisation of the epicure. As the different kinds of eaters are presented above, the 
epicure is very similar to the addict; both eaters eat each meal and subsequent meals 
either without feeling any pleasure or with diminishing amounts of pleasure. The only 
salient difference between them is that the epicure may occasionally experience pleasure 
or an amount of pleasure higher than normal when she eats something extraordinary.  
To me, Telfer’s characterisation of the epicure is erroneous. In terms of 
characterisation, the epicure is more similar to the normal eater and the glutton than what 
Telfer makes her out to be. While it is true that the epicure may experience a surge in 
pleasure when she eats an extraordinary meal, this does not mean that she experiences 
either no pleasure or diminishing amounts of pleasure with each ordinary meal. As I see it, 
 31
the epicure’s having of a refined taste need not amount to her experiencing as such. Just 
like the normal eater and the glutton, the epicure may experience pleasure of around the 
same degree with each ordinary meal.  
If Telfer accepts and incorporates my characterisation of the epicure into her reply to 
Plato’s quantitative argument, then her reply will further undermine Plato’s argument by 
making it apply only to the small number of food addicts worldwide.  
Section 6.2: The Second Philosophically Contentious Point 
The second philosophically contentious point made in the account leading up to Plato’s 
answer on whether a food dish can have an aesthetic value that I would like to investigate 
is Plato’s qualitative argument in Section 5.26 
In reply to Plato’s qualitative argument, Telfer first points out to us that the 
qualitative argument has two interpretations, before she responds to each interpretation of 
the argument. 
According to Telfer, “on one interpretation [of Plato’s qualitative argument], the pain 
in question is the physical pangs of hunger, and Plato is saying that we mistake relief 
from these pangs for a positive pleasure” (Telfer 1996, p. 33).  
To this qualitative argument’s first reading, hereafter referred to as “qualitative 
argument (i),” Telfer is unpersuaded. She writes: 
 
First, it fails to distinguish the physical state (cessation of the pangs of hunger) from 
the mental reaction to it. Second, it fails to recognise that this mental reaction can 
take more than one form: I can be pleased that my pangs of hunger have subsided, but 
                                                 
26 Since it is still fresh in our minds given the proximity with which it has been introduced, I shall not 
summarise Plato’s qualitative argument here. See Section 5 for the details of the qualitative argument. 
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I can also be indifferent (if something else claims my attention), or even distressed (if 
their disappearance is the symptom of some disorder). Third, it assumes that the 
pangs of hunger can be removed only by eating. But this is not the case: they can also 
be removed in other ways, for example by drugs. Fourth, it assumes that the pleasures 
of eating and drinking are dependent on a person having felt hungry previously. But 
this is not true either. There are unexpected but keen pleasures of eating, such as that 
of eating wild raspberries on a country walk, which do not depend on a previous 
hunger... (Telfer 1996, p. 33) 
 
For the four reasons stated in the just quoted passage, Telfer rejects qualitative argument 
(i).  
I endorse only Telfer’s fourth reason for rejecting qualitative argument (i). To me, 
only that reason allows us to successfully reject qualitative argument (i). 
As I see it, Telfer’s first three reasons for rejecting qualitative argument (i) are beside 
the mark.  
As Telfer herself has told us, qualitative argument (i) takes the pain in question to be 
the physical pangs of hunger. Since qualitative argument (i) has already limited itself to 
dealing solely with physical hunger pangs, Telfer’s bringing in of the mental reaction to 
the cessation of those physical hunger pangs in her first two reasons for rejecting the 
argument is irrelevant, and causes the two reasons to fault the argument for something 
beyond its limit. 
As Plato has construed the qualitative argument in Section 5, it is meant to focus on 
the activity of eating. Since the qualitative argument has already limited itself to focus 
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solely on eating, Telfer’s informing us of other methods to remove physical hunger pangs 
in her third reason for rejecting qualitative argument (i), as with her first two reasons, is 
irrelevant, and causes the reason to make no sense.  
As I see it, only Telfer’s fourth reason for rejecting qualitative argument (i) is on 
target.  
As qualitative argument (i) is construed, it does make the unwarranted assumption 
about the pleasures of eating being reliant on a person having been hungry previously. 
Telfer is right to find the assumption wanting in credibility. Some pleasures of eating are 
indeed not reliant on a person having been hungry previously, and these pleasures would 
count as genuine pleasures on qualitative argument (i)’s description of what genuine 
pleasures are. 
According to Telfer, the second interpretation of Plato’s qualitative argument 
“postulates that when he [Plato] writes of the pain which is relieved, he is referring to the 
psychological longing for food, rather than the physical pangs of hunger” (Telfer 1996, p. 
33). On this second interpretation, “his [Plato’s] thesis is that many of our so-called 
pleasures are only relief from the pain of desire, a desire which ceases as soon as we 
obtain the thing we want; genuine pleasure occurs only when the source of it was not 
previously desired” (ibid.).  
To this qualitative argument’s second reading, hereafter referred to as “qualitative 
argument (ii),” Telfer is again unpersuaded. She tells us that firstly, “desire is sometimes 
pleasant rather than painful,” and, secondly, “getting what one previously wanted does 
not always bring even apparent pleasure” (Telfer 1996, p. 33). For the two reasons just 
stated, Telfer rejects qualitative argument (ii).  
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I endorse none of Telfer’s two reasons for rejecting qualitative argument (ii). As I see 
it, both reasons are beside the mark. 
As Telfer herself has told us, qualitative argument (ii) is talking about the sort of 
pleasure that is a relief from a painful desire. Since qualitative argument (ii) has already 
restricted itself to dealing solely with this particular sort of pleasure, Telfer’s informing 
us of pleasant desires and reliefs from desires that are not pleasurable in her two reasons 
for rejecting the argument is irrelevant, and causes the two reasons to fault the argument 
for something beyond its restriction.   
As I see it, to successfully reject qualitative argument (ii), Telfer needs only to adapt 
her fourth reason for rejecting qualitative argument (i) into a reason for rejecting 
qualitative argument (ii). 
As qualitative argument (ii) is construed, it makes the assumption about the pleasures 
of eating being dependent on a person having desired something (such as a fruit cake) 
previously. This assumption, as with the assumption made in qualitative argument (i), is 
unwarranted. Some pleasures of eating, such as that of eating the mash potato 
accompanying the desired prime sirloin steak, are not dependent on a person having 
desired something previously, and these pleasures would count as genuine pleasures on 
qualitative argument (ii)’s description of what genuine pleasures are. 
If Telfer accepts my criticisms and modifies her respective responses to qualitative 
argument (i) and qualitative argument (ii) in accordance with my criticisms, then, firstly, 
her response to qualitative argument (i) will be on target, and, secondly, her response to 
qualitative argument (ii) will successfully undermine the argument.     
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Section 6.3: The Third Philosophically Contentious Point 
The third philosophically contentious point made in the account leading up to Plato’s 
answer on whether a food dish can have an aesthetic value that I would like to inspect is 
Plato’s most basic criterion for identifying a sense as either a higher sense or a lower 
sense in Section 3. 
Plato’s most basic criterion, we recall, is the distance between the sense’s organ and 
object of perception in the sense’s operation. To Plato, this distance indicates a cognitive, 
moral, and aesthetic advantage because it fosters the impression of reason’s separation 
from its present embodiment. When Plato’s most basic criterion is applied to the five 
senses, the result is a hierarchy where the higher senses are considered as superior to the 
lower senses.27 
I find Plato’s most basic criterion problematic.  
As I see it, there is no logically necessary connection between, one, the distance 
between a sense’s organ and object of perception and, two, the same distance’s fostering 
of the impression of reason’s separation from its present embodiment. The latter state of 
affairs just does not logically follow from the former state of affairs. For example, it does 
not logically follow from the fact that there is some distance between my eyes and a 
twinkling star to the notion that an impression of reason’s separation from its present 
embodiment would be fostered in me. This is so as a person can learn, via socialisation, 
either to see or not to see the aforementioned connection. For example, a person can learn 
to see the distance between a sense’s organ and object of perception as an impedimentary 
                                                 
27 See (especially the start of) Section 3 for the full details of Plato’s most basic criterion for identifying a 
sense as either a higher sense or a lower sense. 
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reminder of reason’s insurmountability over its present embodiment, rather than as a 
helpful signal of reason’s surmountableness over its present embodiment.28 
If my criticisms are right, then we should reject Plato’s most basic criterion for 
identifying a sense as either a higher sense or a lower sense. This is so because the most 
basic criterion advocates a connection that is not logically necessary as the “natural” 
connection.29   
Section 6.4: The Fourth Philosophically Contentious Point 
The last philosophically contentious point made in the account leading up to Plato’s 
answer on whether a food dish can have an aesthetic value that I would like to comment 
on is Plato’s tripartite model of the embodied soul in Section 1. 
Plato’s tripartite model of the embodied soul, we recall, is one in which reason 
governs over both spirit and appetite. It presents reason and appetite respectively as the 
most superior and most inferior parts with spirit somewhere between those two parts (but 
closer to reason) in terms of hierarchy.30 
To me, Plato’s model is problematic because it, akin to Plato’s most basic criterion 
for identifying a sense as either a higher sense or a lower sense, advocates a connection 
that is not logically necessary as the “natural” connection.  
To shed light on the aforementioned connection using an example, on Plato’s model, 
when we are thirsty, appetite first tells us that we need a drink, before reason tells us what 
                                                 
28 As another example, a person can also learn to see the lack of distance between a sense’s organ and 
object of perception as a stark and sharp reminder of reason’s surmountableness over its present 
embodiment, rather than as an impedimentary signal of reason’s insurmountability over its present 
embodiment.  
29 The “natural” connection is what led Plato to mistakenly privilege some senses over other senses. Given 
an alternative “natural” connection such as the one described in the preceding paragraph’s example and the 
example in note 28, the hierarchy of the senses may be one where both the higher and lower senses have 
the same status, and both the higher senses’ objects (and their derivative pleasures) and the lower senses’ 
objects (and their derivative pleasures) may be beautiful.    
30 See Section 1 for the full details of Plato’s tripartite model of the embodied soul. 
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to drink and how to get that drink. In this example, as well as in many other similar 
situations, appetite first indicates the good to us, before reason refines and tells us how to 
obtain that good.   
As I see it, there is no logically necessary connection between, one, appetite’s 
indicating of the good to us and reason’s refining and telling us how to obtain that good 
and, two, appetite and reason being respectively regarded as the most superior and most 
inferior parts in Plato’s model. The latter state of affairs just does not logically follow 
from the former state of affairs. This is so as a person can learn, via socialisation, either 
to see or not to see the just stated connection. For instance, a person can learn to see 
appetite’s indicating of the good to us and reason’s refining and telling us how to obtain 
that good as signalling that both appetite and reason have the same status.31 
If my criticisms are right, then we should reject Plato’s tripartite model of the 
embodied soul. 
Section 6.5: Rejection of Plato’s Answer 
“Not only is it the case that a food dish cannot have an aesthetic value, it can have an 
aesthetic disvalue.” This is Plato’s answer to the question on whether a food dish can 
have an aesthetic value. 
At this section’s beginning, we were concerned with whether we should accept 
Plato’s answer. 
Now, assuming that the yardstick for accepting Plato’s answer is the persuasiveness 
of the account leading up to his answer for this thesis, it should be clear to us that we 
                                                 
31 As another instance, a person can learn to see appetite’s indicating of the good to us and reason’s refining 
and telling us how to obtain that good as signalling that appetite is superior to reason. 
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should reject Plato’s answer because the account leading up to his answer is 
unconvincing. 
The rejection of Plato’s answer means that, as of now for this thesis, whether a food 





















Chapter II: Kant on Whether a Food Dish can have an Aesthetic Value 
Can a food dish have an aesthetic value? In this chapter, I first reconstruct Kant’s answer 
to the just stated question in Sections 1 to 4, and then I evaluate his answer in Section 5. 
Kant, like Plato, held a synoptic framework of thought with the various parts of his 
thought intimately linked to one another. As such, Kant’s answer on whether a food dish 
can have an aesthetic value has to be derived from not only his view on aesthetic 
judgments.  
To arrive at Kant’s answer in Section 4, this chapter goes through Kant’s view on the 
structure of human rationality/experience in Section 1, Kant’s view on aesthetic 
judgments in Section 2, and Kant’s view on the human senses in Section 3. The following 
diagram shows this chapter’s flow of Kant’s views and their respective relevant texts by 
Kant:32 
                                                 
32 Looking at Diagram 6, scholars of Kant would immediately wonder why I leave out Kant’s Critique of 
Practical Reason from the discussion. They would think that Kant’s three Critiques, namely, the Critique 
of Pure Reason (1781, second edition 1787), the Critique of Practical Reason (1788), and the Critique of 
the Power of Judgment (1790), best represent Kant’s synoptic framework of thought. While it is true that 
the three Critiques best represent Kant’s synoptic framework of thought in most contexts, for this thesis’ 
purposes, it is enough for us to grasp (the relevant bits of) Kant’s views in the Critique of Pure Reason and 
the Critique of the Power of Judgment. Also, I add Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View 
(1798) to the discussion because that is where Kant talks most about the human senses.  
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Let us begin the reconstruction of Kant’s answer on whether a food dish can have an 
aesthetic value with his view on the structure of human rationality/experience. 
Section 1: Kant’s View on the Structure of Human Rationality/Experience 
In his Critique of Pure Reason (1781, second edition 1787), otherwise and hereafter 
referred to as the first Critique, Kant tells us that the human mind encompasses three 
faculties, namely, sensibility, understanding, and imagination.  
The following diagram illustrates the links between Kant’s descriptions of the human 
mind’s three faculties: 
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Section 1.1: Kant’s Description of Understanding and Concepts 
According to Kant, while sensibility is “the receptivity of our mind” and “makes it 
possible for us [i.e. human beings] to be affected by objects of the senses (perception),” 
understanding allows us to recognise, given the sensory data received by sensibility, what 
objects are being perceived (First Critique, A51/B75, p. 193; Wenzel 2005, p. 154).33 The 
sensory data received by sensibility are called “intuitions” by Kant (First Critique, 
A19/B33, p. 172).34 
According to Kant again, for us to make sense of the intuitions received by sensibility, 
understanding brings those intuitions under, what Kant terms, “concepts” (First Critique, 
A19/B33, p. 172).   
                                                 
33 See Section 1.2 for the full details of Kant’s description of sensibility (and intuitions). 
34 Strictly speaking, the sensory data received by sensibility are called “empirical intuitions” by Kant. See 
Section 1.2 for the full details of Kant’s description of (sensibility and) intuitions. 
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As one commentator reads Kant, a concept is “that which can serve as predicate in 
judgments, as for instance in ‘This is a house,’ or ‘This house is red.’ It is by means of 
the concept house that [we] understand what makes a house a house, that [we] have a 
grasp of its characteristic features, and that [we] can recognise something as a house” 
(Wenzel 1995, p. 150).35  
As the same commentator continues to read Kant, a concept “always comes with rules 
by means of which [we] know how to apply it [i.e. the concept]” (Wenzel 1995, p. 150). 
A rule is hence “a regulation that relates a concept to whatever [intuition] falls under it, 
that is, to which it can be applied” (ibid.). It is “only through rules that combinations (acts 
of synthesis) of intuitions and concepts are objective, that is, that they give us objective 
knowledge of objects” (ibid.).  
As I pick up from where the commentator has left off, Kant also distinguishes 
between two sorts of concept. While empirical concepts are “those which depend on our 
particular experiences,” such as the concept of a house or the concept of pink colour, a 
priori concepts are “those which do not depend on our particular experiences,” such as 
the concept of causality (Lim 2006, PH2207 Lecture 9). 
As Kant explains to us, our having, for example, the empirical concept of a house is 
the result of our having had particular experiences of houses, and our having the same 
concept would have been impossible if we have had no previous experiences of houses.36 
As Kant continues to explain to us, our having, for example, the a priori concept of 
causality, however, is not the result of our having had particular experiences of causality. 
                                                 
35 To put it simply, having the concept of a house means being able to identify and re-identify instances of a 
house in intuitions. 
36 Kant would hence insist that a person would have no empirical concept of a house if she has grown up in 
a place without houses.  
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Rather, our having the same concept, and all other a priori concepts, is the necessary 
condition of the possibility of all our experiences, and our having these concepts is 
logically (not temporally) prior to all our experiences. Without our having these a priori 
concepts, otherwise termed “categories” by Kant, none of our experiences would have 
occurred and can occur (First Critique, A77/B102, p. 210). 
As Kant adds on to his explanation, our having of these categories is universal “in 
such a way that no exception at all is allowed to be possible” (First Critique, B4, p. 137). 
This means that we, insofar as we are human beings, all have these categories, and we all 
have them logically prior to all our experiences. For example, we all have the concept of 
causality logically before the occurrence of all our experiences.   
Section 1.2: Kant’s Description of Sensibility and Intuitions 
In Section 1.1, I introduced sensibility as the mind’s receptivity which makes it possible 
for us to be affected by the senses’ objects of perception, and I introduced intuitions as 
the sensory data received by sensibility. That may have misled the reader into thinking 
that sensibility receives only sensory data and intuitions are just sensory data.  
As the phrase “makes it possible” in the preceding paragraph’s first sentence suggests, 
sensibility apprehends not only sensory data and intuitions are not just sensory data. 
Akin to his distinguishing between two sorts of concept in Section 1.1, Kant 
distinguishes between two sorts of intuition received by sensibility. While empirical 
intuitions are “what [are] given to us through the senses” and depend on our particular 
experiences, such as the intuition of hearing a buzzing mosquito or the intuition of 
smelling mushroom soup, a priori intuitions are direct unmediated apprehensions of or 
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“what [are] given by the forms of intuition, time, and space,” and do not depend on our 
particular experiences (Wenzel 2005, p. 152).  
As Kant says to us, our having, for example, the empirical intuition of hearing a 
buzzing mosquito is the result of our having had particular experiences of buzzing 
mosquitoes, and our having the same intuition would have been impossible if we have 
had no previous experiences of buzzing mosquitoes.37  
As Kant continues to say to us, our having, for example, the a priori intuition of space, 
however, is not the result of our having had particular experiences of space. Rather, our 
having the same intuition, and all other a priori intuitions, is the necessary condition of 
the possibility of all our experiences, and our having these intuitions is logically (not 
temporally) prior to all our experiences. Without our having these a priori intuitions, 
otherwise termed “pure intuition[s]” by Kant, none of our experiences would have 
happened and can happen (First Critique, B147, p. 254).  
As Kant adds on to what he is saying, our having of these pure intuitions, as with the 
having of categories, is universal. This means that we, insofar as we are human beings, 
all have these pure intuitions, and we all have them logically prior to all our experiences. 
For example, we all have the pure intuition of space logically before the happening of all 
our experiences. 
Section 1.3: Kant’s Description of Imagination and Mediations 
According to Kant, imagination “mediates between sensibility and understanding” 
(Wenzel 2005, p. 152).  
                                                 
37 Kant would hence insist that a person would have no empirical intuition of hearing a buzzing mosquito if 
she has grown up in a place without buzzing mosquitoes. 
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According to Kant again, imagination can be said to be mediating between sensibility 
and understanding in two ways. 
Firstly, imagination can be said to be mediating between sensibility and 
understanding in the “reproductive” way when imagination recollects and reassembles 
the intuitions previously received by sensibility under the concepts of understanding 
(Kemal 1992, p. 5). This reproductive mediating is what “allows us to talk and think of 
absent things” (ibid.). 
Secondly, imagination can be said to be mediating between sensibility and 
understanding in the “productive” way when imagination takes up and creatively 
combines the intuitions received by sensibility under the “concepts” of understanding 
(Kemal 1992, p. 5).38 This productive mediating will become important in Kant’s view on 
aesthetic judgments in Section 2 (specifically, Sections 2.3 and 2.4).  
Section 1.4: Kant’s Description of Judgments 
As Kant tells us, concepts (both categories and empirical concepts) of understanding, 
intuitions (both pure intuitions and empirical intuitions) received by sensibility, and the 
mediations (both reproductive mediating and productive mediating) of imagination 
between understanding and sensibility can be said to come together in, what Kant calls 
throughout his First Critique, “judgment[s]”. 
As Kant continues to tell us, these various elements come together as such because 
“every synthesis of representations [i.e. concepts and intuitions] involves a judgment; 
every act of conceptualisation is also an act of judgment” (Kemal 1992, p. 9). When the 
concept of a house is applied to an intuition of seeing an igloo, when the concept of a 
                                                 
38 The word “concepts” is in parenthesis because, strictly speaking, the “concepts” here are not concepts. 
By definition, a concept always comes with rules. As we will see in Section 2, the “concepts” here are 
without rules.    
 46
shape is applied to a recalled intuition of drawing a square, when the intuition of eating a 
cherry is combined with the intuition of eating a tomato, and when the concept of black 
colour is related with the concept of a crow, etc, the applying, combining, and relating, 
etc always express themselves as judgments. 
For Kant, a judgment can hence be defined as “the act by which we combine [under 
the guidance of the categories], in our conscious mind, representations (concepts and 
intuitions) into an objective unity” (Wenzel 2005, p. 152). 
As we shall see next in Kant’s view on aesthetic judgments, Kant distinguishes 
between two main sorts of judgment. 
Section 2: Kant’s View on Aesthetic Judgments 
In his Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790), otherwise and hereafter referred to as 
the third Critique, Kant frames his aesthetical view in terms of, what he calls, “the 
antinomy of Taste.”39 
The antinomy of Taste, or what is commonly referred to as “the problem of Taste,” as 
one scholar reads Kant, can be presented accessibly as follows: 
 
Suppose (1) we want to argue that Taste is not merely a subjective, personal matter, 
yet (2) we do not think Taste is something that can be subjected to objective criteria, 
in the sense that there could be rules for what count as beautiful and what should not. 
                                                 
39 A caveat before we proceed with Kant’s view on aesthetic judgments: Following the footsteps of many 
thinkers of his time (i.e. the Age of Enlightenment), in his aesthetical view, Kant frequently uses the term 
“taste” in a metaphorical manner to refer to “an ability to discern beauty and other aesthetic qualities” 
(Korsmeyer 1999, p. 38). This metaphorical use of “taste” largely differs in meaning from the use of “taste” 
in the literal sense to refer to the ability to taste food (or the actual tasting of food). To avoid confusion, 
hereafter and unless otherwise stated, I shall use “Taste” with the uppercase letter T to refer to aesthetic 
Taste and its associated expressions (like “judgments of Taste” and “the philosophical problem of Taste”), 
and I shall use “taste” with the lowercase letter t to refer to gustatory taste and its associated expressions 
(like “tasting food” and the “literal sense of taste”). 
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If we impose these two requirements and decline to reduce Taste to either of the two 
extremes, the merely subjective and the purely objective, what then could Taste 
possibly be? What could it be based upon? (Wenzel 2005, p. 1)40 
 
With those guiding questions, Kant then writes his third Critique in a way which 
addresses the problem of Taste. Kant’s view on aesthetic judgments, as we shall discover 
in this section, is “an intermediate proposition [or position]” that accounts for both the 
subjective and objective elements of Taste (Third Critique, 338, p. 205). 
 To address the problem of Taste, Kant first distinguishes between two main sorts of 
judgment. At the beginning of his third Critique, Kant writes: 
 
If we wish to discern whether anything is beautiful or not, we do not refer the 
representation of it to the Object by means of understanding with a view to cognition, 
but by means of the imagination (acting perhaps in conjunction with understanding) 
we refer the representation to the Subject and its feeling of pleasure or displeasure. 
The judgment of Taste, therefore, is not a cognitive judgment, and so not logical, but 
is aesthetic—which means that it is one whose determining ground cannot be other 
than subjective. (Third Critique, 203—204, pp. 41—42) 
                                                 
40 Kant writes about the antinomy of Taste as such: 
 
The first commonplace of Taste is contained in the proposition under cover of which every one devoid 
of Taste thinks to shelter himself from reproach: every one has his own Taste. This is only another way 
of saying that the determining ground of this judgment is merely subjective (gratification or pain), and 
that the judgment has no right to the necessary agreement of others. 
 
Its second commonplace, to which even those resort who concede the right of the judgment of Taste to 
pronounce with validity for every one, is: there is no disputing about Taste. This amounts to saying 
that even though the determining ground of a judgment of Taste be objective, it is not reducible to 
definite concepts, so that in respect of the judgment itself no decision can be reached by proofs, 
although it is quite open to us to contend upon the matter, and to contend with right. (Third Critique, 
338, p. 205) 
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As Kant tells us in the just quoted passage, “when we have a representation of an object 
of the senses, be it a sunset or a painting, we can either refer this representation to 
ourselves [as subjects], our mind (Gemϋt), our feeling of our inner lives (Lebensgefϋhl), 
and our feeling of pleasure and displeasure; or we can relate it to the object in order to 
claim something objective about it” (Wenzel 2005, pp. 6—7). While the former kind of 
reference (the referring of the representation to the subject) gives rise to aesthetic 
judgments (or, what Kant calls, “judgement[s] of Taste”), the latter kind of reference (the 
relating of the representation to the object) leads to cognitive judgments.  
As Kant suggests to us in the same passage’s last sentence, unlike cognitive 
judgments which involve concepts with rules that give us objective knowledge, aesthetic 
judgments do not involve the same concepts and hence do not give us objective 
knowledge.41  
Our immediate query is, given the suggestion on aesthetic judgments not involving 
concepts with rules and hence not giving us objective knowledge, how can Kant provide 
an account of aesthetic judgments that is not merely subjective.   
As we shall see in the rest of this section, Kant answers our immediate query by 
filling out the reference—the referring of the representation to the subject—that gives rise 
to aesthetic judgments. 
Section 2.1: The Aesthetic Judgment’s Four Moments 
According to Kant, there are four “moments to which attention is paid by [the aesthetic] 
judgment in its reflection” (Third Critique, 203, note 1, p. 41).  
                                                 
41 It is only through rules, we recall from Section 1.1, that combinations of intuitions and concepts give us 
objective knowledge. 
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As we should note before we proceed, Kant uses the term “moment” in his third 
Critique to indicate some kind of “causal activit[y]” and/or its effect (Wenzel 2005, p. 
13). Kant’s use of “moment” is hence dissimilar to the typical usage of “moment” to 
mean “an indefinitely short period of time,” an “instant,” or “the present time or any 
other particular time” (Dictionary.com 2009, Moment).42    
Section 2.2: The First Moment 
In the first moment, Kant declares that an aesthetic judgment is characterised by a 
“pleasure in the beautiful [that] is ‘disinterested’” (Zangwill 2003, p. 63).  
Kant writes: 
 
The delight which we connect with the representation of the real existence of an 
object is called interest... Now, where the question is whether something is beautiful, 
we do not want to know, whether we, or any one else, are, or even could be 
concerned in the real existence of the thing, but rather what estimate we form of it on 
mere contemplation (intuition or reflection)... Every one must allow that a judgment 
on the beautiful which is tinged with the slightest interest, is very partial and not a 
pure judgment of Taste. (Third Critique, 205, p. 43) 
                                                 
42 In English, the word “moment” has a temporal meaning and is typically used to refer to “an indefinitely 
short period of time,” an “instant,” or “the present time or any other particular time” (Dictionary.com 2009, 
Moment). To take Kant to mean “an indefinitely short period of time,” etc with his use of “moment” (in 
phrases like “moments of Taste,” “logical moments of judgments,” “moment of quality,” etc) in the English 
edition of his third Critique, however, is to misunderstand Kant. This is so because, in the German edition 
of his third Critique, Kant uses the word “das Moment (neuter),” rather than the word “der Moment 
(masc.),” to talk about the aesthetic judgment’s four moments (Wenzel 2005, p. 13). While the latter word 
“der Moment” “has a temporal meaning, referring to an instant, a minute portion or point of time,” the 
former word “das Moment” “has a very different meaning” and indicates “a decisive circumstance, a mark, 
or an aspect” (ibid.). Given Kant’s use of “das Moment” (not “der Moment”) in the German edition of his 
third Critique, we must not take Kant to mean “an indefinitely short period of time,” etc with his use of 
“moment” in the English edition of his third Critique. Rather, we must link Kant’s use of “moment” to the 
use of the same word in mechanics and/or physics to indicate some kind of “causal activit[y]” and/or its 
effect (ibid.). (In mechanics and/or physics, “moment” refers to “a tendency to produce motion, especially 
about an axis” or the “product” or effect of such a tendency (Dictionary.com 2009, Moment).) 
 50
 
As Kant tells us in the just quoted passage, a genuine aesthetic judgment is based on 
“delight” or “satisfaction (pleasure) that is free from any considerations involving 
interest” (Wenzel 2005, p. 19). This satisfaction, which grounds an aesthetic judgment, 
such as “the scene of a bird taking flight from a tree is beautiful,” must even be free from 
any considerations of the scene’s existence (including the existences of the bird and the 
tree in the scene).43 Otherwise, the care or “directedness towards [the scene’s] existence 
[would] impl[y] interest in that which exists” (Schaper 1979, p. 60). 
As Kant continues to tell us in the same passage, in an aesthetic experience, which is 
expressed as an aesthetic judgment, what matters is just “the mere contemplation” or “the 
meaning which I can give to [the] representation, and not on any factor which makes me 
dependent on the real existence of the object” in the representation (Third Critique, 205, 
p. 43). 
Now, on one hand, Kant’s linking of the meaning which I can give to the 
representation with an aesthetic experience makes disinterestedness, as a criterion for 
identifying aesthetic judgments, “a subjective criterion” because “if one applies it [i.e. the 





                                                 
43 The same satisfaction need not care whether the scene of a bird taking flight from a tree really exists or is 
just a scene from a dream, a movie, or a picture. 
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On the other hand, Kant’s linking of the meaning which I can give to the 
representation with an aesthetic experience makes disinterestedness, as a criterion for 
identifying aesthetic judgments, simultaneously an “objective criterion” because “it is an 
‘objectively’ (or better ‘logically’) necessary condition for making a judgment of Taste in 
the sense that it applies to everybody and every judgment of Taste” (Wenzel 2005, p. 20).       
To make clear the satisfaction in the beautiful, which is disinterested, grounding an 
aesthetic judgment, Kant contrasts it with two other kinds of satisfaction, which are both 
interested, respectively grounding two other sorts of judgment. 
According to Kant, the satisfaction in the agreeable, which grounds judgments of 
agreeableness, being that “which the senses find pleasing in sensation,” depends on the 
existence of the representation’s object and its ability to generate sensuous pleasures in us 
(Third Critique, 206, p. 44). That is why it is interested. 
According to Kant again, the satisfaction in the good, which grounds judgments of 
goodness, being “embedded within the realm of necessity” or needs, presupposes 









and ends (Japaridze 2000, p. 24).44 That is why it is interested.45 
                                                 
44 The good may be a “good for something (useful) which only pleases as a means” or a “good in itself” 
which “pleases on its own account” (Third Critique, 208, p. 46).  
45 In an ingenious moment, Kant himself conjured up a map of satisfactions and beings to make clear the 
satisfactions in the beautiful, the agreeable, and the good.  
According to Kant, 
 
agreeableness is a significant factor even with irrational animals; beauty has purport and significance 
only for human beings, i.e. for beings at once animal and rational (but not merely for them as 
rational—intelligent beings—but only for them as at once animal and rational); whereas the good is 
good for every rational being in general... (Third Critique, 210, p. 49) 
 
For an illustration of Kant’s map, see Diagram 8: 
 
 
Although he does not say it explicitly, in the above quoted passage, Kant suggests that animals, being 
“irrational,” are associated with the capacity for seeking satisfactions in the agreeable, and “rational being[s] 
in general,” hereafter referred to as “spirits,” being not “at once animal and rational” (like human beings), 
are linked with the capacity for seeking satisfactions in the good.  
As Kant continues to suggest, human beings, being “at once animal and rational,” “have some features 
in common with animals and some (other) features in common with spirits” (Wenzel 2005, p. 24). While 
both human beings and animals have the capacity for seeking satisfactions in the agreeable in common, 
both human beings and spirits have the capacity for seeking satisfactions in the good in common. Human 
beings, however, have a capacity which both animals and spirits do not have. That capacity is the capacity 
for seeking satisfactions in the beautiful. To Kant, this connection between human beings and the capacity 
for seeking satisfactions in the beautiful—a connection which can only be as such and cannot be 
otherwise—is a hint that “the ability to find something beautiful is part of our human nature” (ibid.). In the 
second moment in Section 2.3, Kant translates this hint into another claim about aesthetic judgments. 
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Section 2.3: The Second Moment 
In the second moment, Kant asserts that “aesthetic judgments claim ‘universality’; that is, 
implicit in them is the claim that others ought to judge or respond [to the corresponding 
aesthetic experiences] similarly” (Stecker 2005, p. 2).  
To support his just mentioned assertion, Kant puts forth two arguments in his chapter 
entitled “Second Moment; Of the Judgment of Taste: Moment of Quantity” from the third 
Critique. While the first argument from his chapter’s section vi “argues for the 
universality of judgments of Taste by way of inference from the first moment, 
disinterestedness,” the second argument from his chapter’s section ix “offers new and 
independent grounds, namely the notion of free play of the faculties,” for the universality 
of aesthetic judgments (Wenzel 2005, p. 28). 
In section vi, Kant first defines “the beautiful [as] that which, apart from concepts, is 
represented as the Object of a UNIVERSAL delight,” before he gives an argument to hold 
up the claim on the beautiful’s universality in his definition (Third Critique, 211, p. 50). 
This argument, hereafter referred to as “the First Argument for Universality,” can be 
presented as follows: 
 
The First Argument for Universality 
1. If I am aware of my own disinterestedness in the delight of M, then I must also be 
aware of the universality of my own disinterestedness. 
2. I am aware of my own disinterestedness in the delight of M. 
3. Therefore, I must also be aware of the universality of my own disinterestedness. 
(From premises 1 and 2) 
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4. If I am aware of the universality of my own disinterestedness, then everyone must 
delight in M. 
5. I am aware of the universality of my own disinterestedness. (From premise 3) 
6. Therefore, everyone must delight in M. (From premises 4 and 5) 
(Where M = the object of the beautiful.)46 
 
As the First Argument for Universality is just presented, although it is “logical-
philosophical,” it is also “psychological-phenomenological” as “it is based on an 
introspection engaged in by someone who makes a judgment of Taste;” while the 
inferences from premises 1 and 2 to premise 3 and premises 4 and 5 to premise 6 are 
logical inferences, the introspections that are made for drawing the same inferences are 
psychological (Wenzel 2005, p. 28).   
To Kant, all of us should be able to make the introspections for drawing the 
inferences in the First Argument for Universality. This is so because our being able to 
make those introspections is the necessary condition of the possibility of all our aesthetic 
experiences, which are expressed as aesthetic judgments. Without our being able to make 
those introspections, none of our aesthetic experiences would have occurred and can 
occur, and there would have been and can be no aesthetic judgements.  
In section ix, Kant first asks “the question of the relative priority in a judgment of 
Taste of the feeling of pleasure and the estimating of the object,” before he gives an 
                                                 
46 Kant writes the First Argument for Universality as such: 
 
This definition of the beautiful is deducible from the foregoing definition of it as an object of delight 
apart from any interest. For where any one is conscious that his delight in an object is with him 
independent of interest, it is inevitable that he should look on the object as one containing a ground of 
delight for all men... he must regard it [the delight apart from any interest] as resting on what he may 
also presuppose in every other person; and therefore he must believe that he has reason for demanding 
a similar delight from every one. (Third Critique, 211—212, pp. 50—51) 
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answer, which contains another argument for the universality of aesthetic judgments 
(Third Critique, 217, p. 57). This argument shall hereafter be referred to as “the Second 
Argument for Universality.”  
Kant’s question can be presented as follows:  
 
In making an aesthetic judgment, does (a) the satisfaction in the beautiful which 
underlies the aesthetic judgment logically precede (b) the judging of the same 
judgment’s object, or does (b) the judging of the aesthetic judgment’s object logically 
precede (a) the satisfaction in the beautiful which underlies the same judgment?47 
 
As Kant answers his question, in making an aesthetic judgment, it is (b) the judging of 
the aesthetic judgment’s object that “is antecedent to” or logically precedes (a) the 
satisfaction in the beautiful which underlies the same judgment (Third Critique, 218, pp. 
58—59).  
As Kant continues to answer his question, in making an aesthetic judgment, if (a) the 
satisfaction in the beautiful which underlies an aesthetic judgment logically precedes (b) 
the judging of the same judgment’s object, then aesthetic judgments would “possess no 
more than private validity” and cannot claim universality (Third Critique, 217, p. 57). 
This is so because, to Kant, while there is something universal about a person’s mental 
state encompassing the movement from (b) the judging to (a) the satisfaction in the 
beautiful, there is nothing universal about a person’s mental state encompassing the 
movement from (a) the satisfaction in the beautiful to (b) the judging.  
                                                 
47 The same question in short: Which comes first—(a) or (b)? 
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Our immediate query is why Kant thinks that there is something universal about a 
person’s mental state encompassing the movement from (b) the judging of the aesthetic 
judgment’s object to (a) the satisfaction in the beautiful which underlies the same 
judgment.48   
As Kant answers our immediate query, there is something universal about a person’s 
mental state encompassing the movement from (b) the judging to (a) the satisfaction in 
the beautiful because the mental state is related to cognition in general via imagination’s 
productive mediating between understanding and sensibility.49 
As Kant continues to answer our immediate query, given that we all have the faculties 
to enact imagination’s productive mediating between understanding and sensibility, we 
all can have the mental state encompassing the movement from (b) the judging to (a) the 
satisfaction in the beautiful. That is why an aesthetic judgment grounded in such a mental 
state can claim universality.50  
As Kant adds on to his answer, in imagination’s productive mediating between 
understanding and sensibility, otherwise called “the free play of the powers of 
representation” by Kant, “understanding does not, by means of a determinate concept, 
guide, determine, and fix imagination. Imagination remains free” (Third Critique, 217, p. 
                                                 
48 From the discussion on the kinds of reference that give rise to aesthetic and cognitive judgments at 
Section 2’s beginning, we know that this mental state cannot refer to the aesthetic judgment’s object as “a 
universal reference point” (Wenzel 2005, p. 49). This does not, however, mean that the mental state has no 
universal reference point. As we shall see quickly, Kant locates the mental state’s universal reference point 
in imagination’s productive mediating between understanding and sensibility.  
49 In Kant’s own words, “the mental state [ ] presents itself in the mutual relation of the powers of 
representation [imagination and understanding] so far as they refer a given representation to cognition in 
general” (Third Critique, 217, p. 58). Imagination’s productive mediating, we recall from Section 1.3, 
happens when imagination takes up and creatively combines the intuitions received by sensibility under the 
concepts of understanding.    
50 In Kant’s own words, “this state of free play of the cognitive faculties attending a representation by 
which an object is given must admit of universal communication” (Third Critique, 218, p. 58).  
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58; Wenzel 2005, pp. 49—50). This free play is best explained by a commentator in the 
following analogy:  
 
Imagine children playing. They do not follow strict rules. They play ‘freely.’ Their 
behaviour is creative and not determined by rules. Nevertheless, their behaviour is not 
chaotic, but makes sense. It literally creates meaning and sense. The children ‘make 
up the rules as they go along’... The powers of representation—imagination and 
understanding—are a little like these children engaged in a play. Their relation is free 
but still makes sense, ‘so far as they agree with each other as is requisite for a 
cognition in general.’ (Wenzel 2005, p. 50)51 
 
As we shall see next, in the third moment, Kant develops this notion of the free play 
of our powers of representation into another claim about aesthetic judgments. 
Section 2.4: The Third Moment 
In the third moment, Kant proclaims that the a priori principle of subjective 
purposiveness underlies an aesthetic judgment. 
According to Kant, the a priori principle of subjective purposiveness is revealed to us 
when we contemplate our encounters with beautiful objects. 
As Kant explains the principle’s revelation, when we encounter a beautiful object, a 
special pleasure is produced in us. The pleasure is special not only because it 
                                                 
51 Sensibility has dwindled in the discussion. This is so because sensibility does not play much of a role in 
the free play of the powers of representation. Imagination, we recall from the description of imagination’s 
reproductive mediating between understanding and sensibility in Section 1.3, can recollect and reassemble 
the intuitions previously received by sensibility under the concepts of understanding. This implies that in 
the free play of the powers of representation, sensibility, if it plays a role at all, is there only to supply the 
intuitions needed for and before the free play.   
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“strengthens and reproduces itself,” but because it relates to cognition in general by 
making us conscious of the animating or “quickening of [our] cognitive powers” (Third 
Critique, 222, p. 64).52 This animating of our cognitive powers is the free play of our 
powers of representation elaborated recently in Section 2.3.53   
As Kant continues to explain the principle’s revelation, once the special pleasure 
makes us conscious of our cognitive powers’ animating, we would find that “this 
pleasurable self-animating state of mind cannot be intended and willfully forced” 
(Wenzel 2005, p. 56). The same mental state is without purpose, “is a present, a gift, 
something given to us,” and it can neither be planned to be achieved nor be prepared to 
be received (ibid.).54 When the mental state presents itself, we would “have forgotten all 
about [our] intentions and deliberations” if there were any initially, and “we merely play 
with the representation of the object through our powers of cognition” (Wenzel 2005, p. 
56 and p. 143). 55  And this play, being a free play, does not involve any “specific 
conceptualisation” with “definite (or determinate) concept[s]” and rules (Crawford 1974, 
p. 76).  
As Kant further explains the principle’s revelation, although the pleasurable mental 
state described in the previous paragraph is without purpose, it is characterised by 
subjective purposiveness. It is characterised by purposiveness because “the various 
ingredients underlying a judgment of Taste—for instance the relation between the 
                                                 
52  Kant refers to the relation between this special pleasure and cognition in general as “an internal 
causality... in respect of cognition generally” (Third Critique, 222, p. 64). 
53 The free play of our powers of representation, we recall from Section 2.3, is imagination’s productive 
mediating between understanding and sensibility in which imagination takes up and creatively combines 
the intuitions received by sensibility under the concepts of understanding. 
54 Although the mental state is without purpose, it is, as we shall see quickly, characterised by some sort of 
purposiveness.  
55 This mental state is in accord with Kant’s declaration in the first moment in Section 2.2 that an aesthetic 
judgment is characterised by a satisfaction in the beautiful that is disinterested and/or free from any 
considerations involving interest.   
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[beautiful] object and my representation of it, and the relation between the mental powers 
of imagination and understanding when representing it—are all purposive (zweckmässig) 
in various respects, which we become aware of through our feelings of pleasure and 
displeasure” (Wenzel 2005, p. 57). It is characterised by subjective purposiveness 
because “the purposiveness underlying [the preceding sentence’s] phenomena [is] felt 
within ourselves” and “we need not, and cannot, derive this purposiveness from anything 
else” (ibid.).56 
To Kant, that we need not and cannot derive the subjective purposiveness from 
anything else “is (an instance of) a primitive and fundamental element: the principle of 
subjective purposiveness, which is an a priori principle of our power of judgment” 
(Wenzel 2005, p. 57). Our having the principle of subjective purposiveness is the 
necessary condition of all our aesthetic experiences, which are expressed as aesthetic 
judgments. Without our having the same principle, none of our aesthetic experiences 
would have happened and can happen, and there would have been and can be no aesthetic 
judgements. 
Section 2.5: The Fourth Moment 
In the fourth moment, Kant announces that an aesthetic judgment is characterised by 
necessity in the sense that it “exacts agreement from every one” and “every one ought to 
give the [beautiful] object in question his approval and... describ[e] it as beautiful” (Third 
Critique, 237, p. 82). 
As Kant explicates his announcement, when the first three moments of disinterested 
satisfaction, universality, and subjective purposiveness without purpose are in place, “we 
                                                 
56  This subjective purposiveness is consonant with the kind of reference that gives rise to aesthetic 
judgments. That kind of reference, we recall from Section 2’s beginning, refers the representation of the 
beautiful object to the subject.    
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cannot but judge the [beautiful] object to be beautiful” (Wenzel 2005, p. 144). This is so 
as “we are [all] fortified with a ground common to all;” for the same beautiful object, we 
are all capable of having the interest-free satisfaction from the first moment, the free play 
of our powers of representation from the second moment, and the subjective 
purposiveness without purpose from the third moment (Third Critique, 237, p. 82).  
Section 2.6: Kant’s Intermediate Aesthetical Position 
At Section 2’s beginning, we were informed that Kant frames his aesthetical view in 
terms of the problem of Taste, which imposes two extreme positions—the merely 
subjective stance and the purely objective stance—on Taste, but declines to reduce Taste 
to either one of them.  
At the same beginning, we were also told that Kant’s view on aesthetic judgments is 
“an intermediate proposition [or position]” that accounts for both the subjective and 
objective elements of Taste (Third Critique, 338, p. 205). 
Now, we see clearly how Kant’s view is an intermediate position; while Kant’s view 
is peppered with subjective elements (such as the reference of the beautiful object’s 
representation to the subject, the application of disinterestedness to one’s own mental 
state, etc), it is simultaneously filled with objective elements (such as faculties and 
capabilities common to all human beings, the a priori principle of subjective 
purposiveness, etc), which underlie the subjective elements and prevent them from 
making Taste a solely personal matter.   
Section 3: Kant’s View on the Human Senses 
Can a food dish have an aesthetic value? This question was posed hypothetically to Kant 
at this chapter’s beginning. 
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As Kant can be imagined to answer the question based on his views on the structure 
of human rationality/experience and aesthetic judgments in Sections 1 to 2, “yes, a food 
dish can have an aesthetic value insofar as it is the object of an aesthetic judgment, which 
is characterised by the four moments of disinterested satisfaction, universality, subjective 
purposiveness without purpose, and necessity.” 
The preceding paragraph’s imagined Kant’s answer is, however, not Kant’s actual 
answer on whether a food dish can have an aesthetic value. 
As we shall see in this section, Kant’s view on the human senses would lead him to 
deny that a food dish can have an aesthetic value. 
Section 3.1: The Connections between the Senses and Subjectivity 
In Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798), hereafter referred to as 
Anthropology, Kant splits the five human senses into two main groups.57 While sight, 
hearing, and touch are classified under the group labelled as “the higher senses,” taste and 
smell are categorised under the group labelled as “the lower senses.”58 
At the start of his exposition on the senses from Anthropology, Kant writes: 
 
[The three higher senses] are more objective than subjective, that is, they contribute, 
as empirical intuition, more to the cognition of the exterior object, than they arouse 
the consciousness of the affected organ. Two [i.e. the lower senses], however, are 
more subjective than objective, that is, the idea obtained from them is more an idea of 
                                                 
57 Kant’s division of the senses into two main groups should not be blindly equated with Plato’s division of 
the senses into two main groups of the same labels. 
58 The higher senses are also often referred to as “the mechanical senses,” and the lower senses are also 
often referred to as “the chemical senses.” 
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enjoyment, rather than the cognition of the external object. (Anthropology c. 2005, p. 
210) 
 
As the just quoted passage is written, some commentators read Kant to be drawing a tight 
relation between the higher senses and cognitive judgments, since the higher senses 
“contribute... more to the cognition of the exterior object” and cognitive judgments, as we 
have learnt from Section 2’s beginning, arise from the reference of the representation to 
the object. 
As the same passage is written, the commentators also read Kant to be drawing a tight 
relation between the lower senses and aesthetic judgments, since the lower senses’ “idea... 
is more an idea of enjoyment, rather than the cognition of the external object” and 
aesthetic judgments, as we have learnt from Section 2’s beginning, arise from the 
reference of the representation to the subject. 
To me, these commentators have misread Kant. 
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      With reference to Diagram 9, when Kant says that the higher senses “are more 
objective than subjective” in the passage, he is simultaneously drawing a relation 
between the higher senses and objectivity, and a connection between the higher senses 
and subjectivity. This is so because the phrase “more objective than subjective” suggests 
that the higher senses are objective in one respect and subjective in another respect. 
Ignoring the respect in which the higher senses, except touch, are objective for this thesis, 
as we shall see in Section 3.2, the higher senses, except touch, are subjective in the 
respect where they are connected with aesthetic judgments.  
With reference to Diagram 9 again, when Kant says that the lower senses “are more 
subjective than objective” in the passage, he is simultaneously drawing a relation 
between the lower senses and objectivity, and a connection between the lower senses and 
subjectivity. This is so because the phrase “more subjective than objective” suggests that 
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the lower senses are objective in one respect and subjective in another respect. Ignoring 
the respect in which the lower senses are objective for this thesis, as we shall see in 
Section 3.3, the lower senses are subjective in the respect where they are connected with 
judgments of agreeableness. 
Section 3.2: Kant’s Descriptions of the Higher Senses 
According to Kant, sight and hearing (but not touch) are connected with aesthetic 
judgments. This is so because “while any sense experience may be merely pleasant [or 
agreeable], experiences employing vision [i.e. sight] or hearing may also deliver 
presentations for aesthetic judgments” (Korsmeyer 1999, p. 57). 
According to Kant again, when a visual experience or an auditory experience 
expresses itself as an aesthetic judgment characterised by the four moments of 
disinterested satisfaction, universality, subjective purposiveness without purpose, and 
necessity, it is an aesthetic experience, and its object can be said to have an aesthetic 
value. 
Although he does not say it explicitly, in his respective descriptions of sight and 
hearing, Kant indicates the possibility of aesthetic visual and/or auditory experiences.  
Section 3.2.1: Kant’s Description of Sight 
As Kant describes sight, (a) sight is “the noblest, because among all the senses... it not 
only has the widest sphere of perception in space, but also its organ feels least affected,” 
and (b) sight “comes nearer to being a pure intuition (the immediate representation of the 
given object, without admixture of noticeable sensation)” (Anthropology c. 2006, p. 48).59 
                                                 
59 Our having of pure intuitions, we recall from Section 1.2, is the universal and necessary condition of the 
possibility of all our experiences.  
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As Kant continues to describe sight, (c) sight allows “the cosmos [to] become[ ] 
known to us to an extent so immeasurable that, especially with the self-luminous celestial 
bodies, when we check their distance with our measures here on earth, we become 
fatigued over the long number sequence” (Anthropology c. 2006, p. 48). 
While Kant suggests that sight enables us to engage in experiences characterised by 
disinterested satisfaction (first moment) in the preceding paragraphs’ first piece of 
information (a), he suggests that sight enables us to engage in experiences characterised 
by universality (second moment) and necessity (fourth moment) in the paragraphs’ 
second piece of information (b), and he suggests that sight enables us to engage in 
experiences characterised by subjective purposiveness without purpose (third moment) in 
the same paragraphs’ third piece of information (c). 
The result of putting together Kant’s suggestions in pieces of information (a), (b), and 
(c) is Kant’s indication of the possibility of aesthetic visual experiences. 
Section 3.2.2: Kant’s Description of Hearing 
As Kant describes hearing, (a) hearing is “of merely mediate perception—through and by 
means of the air that surrounds us a distant object to a large extent is cognized,” and (b) 
“people born deaf [i.e. people without hearing]... must remain mute (without speech), 
[and] can never arrive at anything more than an analogue of reason” (Anthropology c. 
2006, p. 47). 
As Kant continues to describe hearing, (c) “music, which is a regular play of aural 
sensations [or sensations specific to hearing]... is as it were a language of sheer sensations 
(without any concepts)” (Anthropology c. 2006, p. 47).  
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While Kant suggests that hearing enables us to engage in experiences characterised 
by disinterested satisfaction (first moment) in the preceding paragraphs’ first piece of 
information (a), he suggests that hearing enables us to engage in experiences 
characterised by universality (second moment) and necessity (fourth moment) in the 
paragraphs’ second piece of information (b), and he suggests that hearing enables us to 
engage in experiences characterised by subjective purposiveness without purpose (third 
moment) in the same paragraphs’ third piece of information (c). 
The result of putting together Kant’s suggestions in pieces of information (a), (b), and 
(c) is Kant’s indication of the possibility of aesthetic auditory experiences. 
Section 3.2.3: Kant’s Description of Touch in its Objective Respect 
As said in Section 3.1, Kant classifies touch with sight and hearing under the group 
labelled as “the higher senses.” This classification is as such insofar as Kant looks at 
touch in its objective respect. 
As Kant describes touch in its objective respect, or “in its exploratory role, touch 
coordinates with vision more than any other sense, and in this case it provides [objective] 
information about objects” (Korsmeyer 1999, p. 57).   
As Kant continues to describe touch in its objective respect, touch, being “the only 
one [sense] of immediate external perception,” is “also the most important and the most 
reliably instructive,” and “without [touch’s] sense organ we would be unable to form any 
concept at all of a bodily shape” (Anthropology c. 2006, pp. 46—47). 
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Kant’s positive gaze on touch, however, diminishes when he looks at touch in its 
subjective respect. As we shall see in Section 3.3, and, specifically, Section 3.3.3, when 
Kant looks at touch in its subjective respect, he categorises touch with the lower senses.60 
Section 3.3: Kant’s Descriptions of the Lower Senses 
According to Kant, taste and smell, and touch in its subjective respect are connected with 
judgments of agreeableness (but not aesthetic judgments). This is so because, unlike 
visual and/or auditory experiences which may deliver presentations for aesthetic 
judgments, gustatory and/or olfactory and/or tactile experiences can never deliver 
presentations for aesthetic judgments.   
According to Kant again, a gustatory experience or an olfactory experience or a 
tactile experience can never express itself as an aesthetic judgment characterised by the 
four moments of disinterested satisfaction, universality, subjective purposiveness without 
purpose, and necessity, so it can never be an aesthetic experience, and its object can never 
be said to have an aesthetic value. 
According to Kant once more, a gustatory experience or an olfactory experience or a 
tactile experience can at most express itself as a judgment of agreeableness, which is why 
it can at most be an agreeable or a pleasant experience, and its object can at most be said 
to have an agreeable value.61     
Although he does not say it explicitly, in his respective descriptions of taste, smell, 
and touch in its subjective respect, Kant indicates the impossibility of aesthetic gustatory 
and/or olfactory and/or tactile experiences.  
                                                 
60 This claim about Kant’s categorising of touch with the lower senses when he looks at touch in its 
subjective respect accounts for the portion of the bracket drawn with a dotted line in Diagram 9.  
61 A judgment of agreeableness, we recall from Section 2.2, is based on the interested satisfaction in the 
agreeable, which depends on the existence of the representation’s object and its ability to generate sensuous 
pleasures in us. 
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Section 3.3.1: Kant’s Description of Taste 
As Kant describes taste, (a) taste “is activated when the organ of the tongue, the gullet, 
and the palate come into touch with an external object,” and (b) “pleasant” or “sensuous” 
taste, as opposed to “rationalizing Taste,” “can never yield a universally valid judgment: 
namely, that something (for example, something bitter) which is pleasant to me will also 
be pleasant to everybody” (Anthropology c. 2005, p. 210 and p. 212). 
As Kant continues to describe taste, (c) taste “contains the concept of a distinction 
between satisfaction and dissatisfaction” (Anthropology c. 2005, p. 210 and p. 212).62 
While Kant suggests that taste disenables us to engage in experiences characterised 
by disinterested satisfaction (first moment) in the preceding paragraphs’ first piece of 
information (a), he suggests that taste disenables us to engage in experiences 
characterised by universality (second moment) and necessity (fourth moment) in the 
paragraphs’ second piece of information (b), and he suggests that taste disenables us to 
engage in experiences characterised by subjective purposiveness without purpose (third 
moment) in the same paragraphs’ third piece of information (c). 
The result of putting together Kant’s suggestions in pieces of information (a), (b), and 
(c) is Kant’s indication of the impossibility of aesthetic gustatory experiences. 
Section 3.3.2: Kant’s Description of Smell 
As Kant describes smell, (a) smell “is activated by drawing in air which is mixed with 
alien vapours,” “air which has to penetrate the organ [i.e. the nose], in order to allow its 
specific sensation to reach it [i.e. the nose],” and (b) “smell is, so to speak, taste at a 
                                                 
62 Concepts, we recall from Section 1.1, are what the intuitions received by sensibility are brought under by 
understanding, and concepts, by definition, always come with rules that make the combinations of 
intuitions and concepts objective.  
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distance” and “does not pay us to cultivate it or to refine it” (Anthropology c. 2005, pp. 
210—211). 
As Kant continues to describe smell, (c) smell “interfer[es] with individual freedom” 
although it has the function of “warn[ing] us not to breathe noxious air (such as vapor 
from a stove, or the stench from a swamp or from dead animals), or keep[ing] us from 
eating rotten food” (Anthropology c. 2005, pp. 210—211). 
While Kant suggests that smell disenables us to engage in experiences characterised 
by disinterested satisfaction (first moment) in the preceding paragraphs’ first piece of 
information (a), he suggests that smell disenables us to engage in experiences 
characterised by universality (second moment) and necessity (fourth moment) in the 
paragraphs’ second piece of information (b), and he suggests that smell disenables us to 
engage in experiences characterised by subjective purposiveness without purpose (third 
moment) in the same paragraphs’ third piece of information (c). 
The result of putting together Kant’s suggestions in pieces of information (a), (b), and 
(c) is Kant’s indication of the impossibility of aesthetic olfactory experiences. 
Section 3.3.3: Kant’s Description of Touch in its Subjective Respect 
As Kant describes touch in its subjective respect, (a) touch “appears to have [been] 
allotted... only to the human being,” and (b) touch “through touching the surface of a 
solid body [ ] can inquire after its shape” (Anthropology c. 2006, p. 46). 
As Kant continues to describe touch in its subjective respect, (c) touch allows us to 
“form a concept from the shape of a body by touching it on all sides” (Anthropology c. 
2006, p. 46).63 
                                                 
63 See note 62. 
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While Kant suggests that touch enables us to engage in experiences characterised by 
universality (second moment) and necessity (fourth moment) in the preceding 
paragraphs’ first piece of information (a), he suggests that touch disenables us to engage 
in experiences characterised by disinterested satisfaction (first moment) in the 
paragraphs’ second piece of information (b), and he suggests that touch disenables us to 
engage in experiences characterised by subjective purposiveness without purpose (third 
moment) in the same paragraphs’ third piece of information (c). 
The result of putting together Kant’s suggestions in pieces of information (a), (b), and 
(c) is Kant’s indication of the impossibility of aesthetic tactile experiences. 
Section 3.4: The Hierarchy of the Human Senses 
To summarise Section 3 as a whole, Kant’s view on the five senses is hierarchical, and 
each sense’s position on the hierarchy depends largely on the sort of subjective judgment 
it is connected with. 
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With reference to Diagram 10, Kant’s view presents the higher senses excluding 
touch, which are linked to aesthetic judgments, as superior to touch and the lower senses, 
which are linked to judgments of agreeableness. Specifically, it presents sight as the most 
superior sense amongst the five senses, hearing as inferior to sight but superior to touch 
and the lower senses, touch as inferior to its fellow higher senses but superior to the 
lower senses, taste as inferior to the higher senses but superior to smell, and smell as the 
most inferior sense amongst the five senses.  
The implications of Kant’s view are, firstly, “only vision [i.e. sight] and hearing 
qualify as aesthetic senses,” so only their objects of perception can be said to have an 
aesthetic value, and, secondly, touch, taste, and smell do not qualify as aesthetic senses, 
so their objects of perception cannot be said to have an aesthetic value (Korsmeyer 1999, 
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p. 57). Touch, taste, and smell at most qualify as agreeable senses, so their objects can at 
most be said to have an agreeable value. 
Section 4: Kant’s Answer on Whether a Food Dish can have an Aesthetic Value 
Can a food dish have an aesthetic value? This question was posed hypothetically to Kant 
at this chapter’s beginning. 
At Section 3’s beginning, based on his views on the structure of human 
rationality/experience and aesthetic judgments in Sections 1 to 2, Kant was imagined to 
answer the question as follows: “yes, a food dish can have an aesthetic value insofar as it 
is the object of an aesthetic judgment, which is characterised by the four moments of 
disinterested satisfaction, universality, subjective purposiveness without purpose, and 
necessity.” 
As said then, the preceding paragraph’s imagined Kant’s answer is not Kant’s actual 
answer on whether a food dish can have an aesthetic value. 
Now, as Kant would answer the question based on his views on the structure of 
human rationality/experience, aesthetic judgments, and human senses in Sections 1 to 3, 
“no, a food dish cannot have an aesthetic value.” This is so because, to Kant, a food dish 
can never be the object of an aesthetic judgment.  
As Kant would add to his answer based on his views on the structure of human 
rationality/experience, aesthetic judgments, and human senses in Sections 1 to 3, “a food 
dish can at most have an agreeable value.” This is so because, to Kant, a food dish can at 




Section 5: Evaluation of Kant’s Answer 
“No, a food dish cannot have an aesthetic value. It can at most have an agreeable value.” 
This is Kant’s answer to the question on whether a food dish can have an aesthetic value. 
Our immediate concern is whether we should accept Kant’s answer on whether a food 
dish can have an aesthetic value. Assuming that the yardstick for accepting Kant’s answer 
is the persuasiveness of the account leading up to his answer for this thesis, I suggest that 
we should reject Kant’s answer because the account leading up to his answer is 
unconvincing.64 
In what follows, I concentrate on and argue against four philosophically contentious 
points made in the account leading up to Kant’s answer on whether a food dish can have 
an aesthetic value.65   
Section 5.1: The First Philosophically Contentious Point 
The first philosophically contentious point made in the account leading up to Kant’s 
answer on whether a food dish can have an aesthetic value that I would like to examine is 
Kant’s view on the human senses in Section 3.66 
Although Kant does not say it explicitly, in his view on the human senses, he uses a 
certain (hidden) criterion to identify a sense as either an aesthetic sense or an agreeable 
sense.  
                                                 
64 The yardstick for accepting Kant’s answer is the same as the yardstick for accepting Plato’s answer on 
whether a food dish can have an aesthetic value in Chapter I’s Section 6. 
65 A caveat about what I am going to do: For the four philosophically contentious points that I focus on and 
argue against in what follows, I mostly leave aside the empirically contentious claims made in them to the 
relevant experts. I address the empirically contentious claims only when it is necessary, i.e. only when any 
of these claims have a strong bearing on any of the philosophically contentious points.     
66 Since it is still fresh in our minds given the proximity with which it has been introduced, I shall not 
summarise Kant’s view on the human senses here. See Section 3 for the details of Kant’s view on the 
human senses. 
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To Kant, the most basic criterion for identifying a sense as either an aesthetic sense or 
an agreeable sense is the distance between the sense’s organ of perception and its object 
of perception in the sense’s operation. 67 An aesthetic sense is one with maximal distance 
between its organ and object of perception in its operation, and an agreeable sense is one 
with minimal distance between its organ and object of perception in its operation. 
To Kant again, the distance between the sense’s organ and object of perception stands 
not only for the extent of space between the organ and the object, but also refers to the 
human body’s apparent involvement in the sense’s operation. To put it in correlative 
terms: The further (closer) the organ is from the object, the lower (higher) the degree of 
apparent bodily involvement in the sense’s operation. For Kant, as with Plato in Chapter 
I’s Section 3 and “virtually all analyses of the senses in Western philosophy,” the 
distance between the organ and object of perception is seen “as a cognitive, moral, and 
aesthetic advantage” (Korsmeyer 1999, p. 12). The explanation is that the distance fosters 
an impression of detachment which facilitates the onset of an aesthetic experience 
characterised by the four moments of (especially) disinterested satisfaction, universality, 
subjective purposiveness without purpose, and necessity. 
I find Kant’s most basic criterion problematic.68  
As I see it, there is no logically necessary connection between, one, the distance 
between a sense’s organ and object of perception and, two, the same distance’s fostering 
of the impression of detachment which facilitates the onset of an aesthetic experience. 
                                                 
67 Kant’s hidden criterion for identifying a sense as either an aesthetic sense or an agreeable sense is similar 
to Plato’s most basic criterion for identifying a sense as either a higher sense or a lower sense in Chapter I’s 
Section 3. 
68 I find Kant’s most basic criterion for identifying a sense as either an aesthetic sense or an agreeable sense 
problematic in the same way as I find Plato’s most basic criterion for identifying a sense as either a higher 
sense or a lower sense problematic. 
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The latter state of affairs just does not logically follow from the former state of affairs. 
For example, it does not logically follow from the fact that there is some distance 
between my eyes and the bright sun to the notion that an impression of detachment would 
be fostered in me. This is so as a person can learn, via socialisation, either to see or not to 
see the aforementioned connection. For example, a person can learn to see the distance 
between a sense’s organ and object of perception as an impedimentary concern in 
facilitating the onset of an aesthetic experience, rather than as a helpful unconcern in 
facilitating the onset of an aesthetic experience. 
If my criticisms are right, then we should reject Kant’s most basic criterion for 
identifying a sense as either an aesthetic sense or an agreeable sense. This is so because 
the most basic criterion advocates a connection that is not logically necessary as the 
“natural” connection.69   
Section 5.2: The Second Philosophically Contentious Point 
The second philosophically contentious point made in the account leading up to Kant’s 
answer on whether a food dish can have an aesthetic value that I would like to investigate 
is Kant’s First Argument for Universality in Section 2.3. 
Kant’s First Argument for Universality, we recall, is put forth by Kant to support his 
assertion that aesthetic judgments claim universality. Although the First Argument for 
Universality is logical-philosophical, it is also psychological-phenomenological; while 
the argument’s inferences are logical inferences, the introspections that are made for 
                                                 
69 The “natural” connection is what led Kant to mistakenly privilege some senses over other senses. Given 
an alternative “natural” connection such as the one described in the preceding paragraph’s example, the 
hierarchy of the senses may be one in which all the senses have the same status, and all the senses’ objects 
can have an aesthetic value.   
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drawing the same inferences are psychological. To Kant, all of us should be able to make 
the introspections for drawing the argument’s inferences.70    
In response to Kant’s First Argument for Universality, Pierre Bourdieu tells us that 
the argument, though logically-philosophically valid, is psychologically-
phenomenologically invalid and should be rejected.  
According to Bourdieu, for the First Argument for Universality to be psychologically-
phenomenologically valid, all of us should be able to make the introspections for drawing 
the argument’s inferences. 71  However, not all of us are able to make the same 
introspections. 
According to Bourdieu again, only the class of people with plenty of money and 
leisure time, or what he refers to as the class of people with “the Taste of liberty or 
luxury” and “a life of ease,” are able to make the introspections for drawing the 
inferences in the First Argument for Universality (Bourdieu 1984, p. 6). Other classes of 
people, such as the class of “‘common’ people” who are tied down with the “necessities” 
of everyday living, so Bourdieu observes, are unable to make the same introspections 
(ibid.).  
As Bourdieu goes on to claim from his previous paragraph’s observations, since not 
all of us are able to make the introspections for drawing the inferences in Kant’s First 
Argument for Universality, the argument is psychologically-phenomenologically invalid 
and should be rejected.  
                                                 
70 See Section 2.3 for the full details of Kant’s First Argument for Universality. 
71 As we have seen in Section 2.3, Kant does think that all of us should be able to make the introspections 
for drawing the inferences in the First Argument for Universality. This is so because our being able to make 
those introspections is the necessary condition of the possibility of all our aesthetic experiences, which are 
expressed as aesthetic judgments. 
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I disagree with Bourdieu’s response to Kant’s First Argument for Universality.72 
Kant’s First Argument for Universality, as I have developed it in Section 2.3, does 
not fall prey to Bourdieu’s charge of being psychologically-phenomenologically invalid. 
This is so because, when Kant says that all of us should be able to make the 
introspections for drawing the inferences in the First Argument for Universality, he 
means that, given the right conditions, all of us should be able to make the same 
introspections. Given the right conditions, such as plenty of money and leisure time, all 
of us, including Bourdieu’s class of common people, should be able to make the 
aforementioned introspections, so the First Argument for Universality remains 
psychologically-phenomenologically valid. 
Despite my disagreement with Bourdieu, I share Bourdieu’s discontentment about the 
privileging of the living conditions of the class of people with plenty of money and 
leisure time in Kant’s First Argument for Universality behind his response, and this 
discontentment drives my response to the argument. 
To me, Kant’s First Argument for Universality is problematic because it, akin to 
Kant’s most basic criterion for identifying a sense as either an aesthetic sense or an 
agreeable sense in Section 5.1, advocates a connection that is not logically necessary as 
the “natural” connection. 
As I see it, there is no logically necessary connection between, one, the living 
conditions of the class of people with plenty of money and leisure time and, two, the right 
conditions for us to be able to make the introspections for drawing the inferences in the 
First Argument for Universality. The latter state of affairs just does not logically follow 
                                                 
72 This is not the same as saying that I doubt the authenticity of Bourdieu’s observations. Bourdieu, as a 
sociologist with strong academic credentials and as the “author of more than 25 influential books,” is an 
excellent fieldworker (Johnson 2002, The Guardian). 
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from the former state of affairs. For example, it does not logically follow from the fact 
that there is a group of rich housewives with lots of free time to the notion that these 
housewives’ living conditions are the right conditions for all human beings to be able to 
make the introspections for drawing the inferences in the First Argument for Universality. 
This is so as a person from the class of people with plenty of money and leisure time can, 
like a person from the class of common people, be unable to make the introspections for 
drawing the inferences in the First Argument for Universality. For example, a rich 
housewife with lots of free time may be too overwhelmed with the luxuries of everyday 
living to be able to make the aforementioned introspections. 
If my criticisms are right, then we should reject Kant’s First Argument for 
Universality. 
Section 5.3: The Third Philosophically Contentious Point 
The third philosophically contentious point made in the account leading up to Kant’s 
answer on whether a food dish can have an aesthetic value that I would like to inspect is 
Kant’s criterion for identifying aesthetic experiences in Section 2.2. 
Kant’s criterion, we recall, is the disinterested satisfaction in the beautiful, which is 
free from any considerations involving interest. The disinterested satisfaction is even free 
from any considerations of the beautiful object’s existence.73 
In response to Kant’s criterion, Robert Stecker points out to us that “if disinterest 
requires indifference to or a lack of concern with the real existence of its objects, it’s hard 
to see how much aesthetic experience can be correctly characterized as disinterested” 
(Stecker 2005, p. 37).  
                                                 
73 See Section 2.2 for the full details of Kant’s declaration that an aesthetic judgment is characterised by a 
disinterested satisfaction in the beautiful. 
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As Stecker illustrates his point, 
 
[w]hen I enjoy the sight of a beautiful bird, an important part of my appreciation of it 
is as a living thing of a certain kind. An imaginary bird seen in a virtual reality show 
or a bird-like artifact, no matter how perfectly resembling the real thing, would not 
deliver the same experience or, rather, possibly could only if I misjudge these to be 
living (hence existing) creatures. (Stecker 2005, p. 37) 
 
I disagree with Stecker’s response to Kant’s criterion for identifying aesthetic 
experiences.  
As I see it, Stecker’s response is beside the mark. This is so because, instead of 
addressing directly Kant’s criterion, Stecker talks pass Kant when he criticises Kant’s 
criterion from his own perspective on what are aesthetic experiences.  
To Stecker, as suggested by his words “it’s hard to see how much aesthetic 
experience can be correctly characterized as disinterested,” aesthetic experiences 
encompass more than the experiences characterised by disinterested satisfaction.74 
To Kant, however, aesthetic experiences are simply the experiences characterised by 
disinterested satisfaction. Kant hence does not need to worry about “correctly 
characteri[sing]” Stecker’s aesthetic experiences other than the experiences characterised 
by disinterested satisfaction, and he can persist in his denial of experiences involving 
considerations of the beautiful object’s existence from what, to him, are aesthetic 
experiences.     
                                                 
74 To Stecker, in other words, the experiences characterised by disinterested satisfaction are just one sort of 
aesthetic experience amongst other sorts of aesthetic experience. 
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Despite my disagreement with Stecker, I share Stecker’s disgruntlement about the 
privileging of experiences characterised by disinterested satisfaction in Kant’s criterion 
for identifying aesthetic experiences behind his response, and this disgruntlement drives 
my response to Kant’s criterion.  
To me, Kant’s criterion is problematic because it lacks substance. For Kant’s criterion 
to be persuasive, Kant needs to give us the reasons for picking disinterested satisfaction 
as the criterion for identifying aesthetic experiences. Without the aforementioned reasons, 
Kant’s criterion appears to be just the result of Kant’s whims and fancies.75 
If my criticisms are right, then we should reject Kant’s criterion for identifying 
aesthetic experiences. 
Section 5.4: The Fourth Philosophically Contentious Point 
The last philosophically contentious point made in the account leading up to Kant’s 
answer on whether a food dish can have an aesthetic value that I would like to comment 
on is the imagined Kant’s answer on whether a food dish can have an aesthetic value in 
Section 3’s beginning and Kant’s actual answer on whether a food dish can have an 
aesthetic value in Section 4. 
The imagined Kant’s answer, we recall, is as such: “yes, a food dish can have an 
aesthetic value insofar as it is the object of an aesthetic judgment, which is characterised 
by the four moments of disinterested satisfaction, universality, subjective purposiveness 
without purpose, and necessity.” It is based on Kant’s views on the structure of human 
rationality/experience and aesthetic judgments in Sections 1 to 2.76 
                                                 
75 Or if we agree with Bourdieu’s observations in Section 5.2, Kant’s criterion appears to be just the result 
of the whims and fancies of the class of people with plenty of money and leisure time. 
76 See Section 3’s beginning for the full details of the imagined Kant’s answer on whether a food dish can 
have an aesthetic value. 
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Kant’s actual answer, we recall, is as such: “no, a food dish cannot have an aesthetic 
value. It can at most have an agreeable value.” It is based on Kant’s views on the 
structure of human rationality/experience, aesthetic judgments, and human senses in 
Sections 1 to 3.77 
I find both the imagined Kant’s answer and Kant’s actual answer problematic. 
Firstly, if my criticisms of Kant’s most basic criterion for identifying a sense as either 
an aesthetic sense or an agreeable sense in Section 5.1 are right, then Kant’s actual 
answer is uncalled for. 
Secondly, if my criticisms of Kant’s most basic criterion for identifying a sense as 
either an aesthetic sense or an agreeable sense in Section 5.1, my criticisms of Kant’s 
First Argument for Universality in Section 5.2, and my criticisms of Kant’s criterion for 
identifying aesthetic experiences in Section 5.3 are right, then both the imagined Kant’s 
answer and Kant’s actual answer are undeserving.  
We should hence reject both the imagined Kant’s answer and Kant’s actual answer. 
Section 5.5: Rejection of Kant’s Answer 
“No, a food dish cannot have an aesthetic value. It can at most have an agreeable value.” 
This is Kant’s answer to the question on whether a food dish can have an aesthetic value. 
At this section’s beginning, we were concerned with whether we should accept 
Kant’s answer. 
Now, assuming that the yardstick for accepting Kant’s answer is the persuasiveness 
of the account leading up to his answer for this thesis, it should be clear to us that we 
should reject Kant’s answer because the account leading up to his answer is unconvincing. 
                                                 
77 See Section 4 for the full details of Kant’s actual answer on whether a food dish can have an aesthetic 
value. 
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The rejection of Kant’s answer means that, as of now for this thesis, whether a food 






















Conclusion: Whether a Food Dish can have an Aesthetic Value remains an Open 
Question 
Can a food dish have an aesthetic value? This question was asked at this thesis’s 
beginning. 
To respond to the question, in this thesis, I reconstructed and evaluated Plato’s 
answer and Kant’s answer on whether a food dish can have an aesthetic value. In Chapter 
I, I reconstructed and evaluated Plato’s answer. In Chapter II, I reconstructed and 
evaluated Kant’s answer.  
At the two chapters’ endings, after my respective examinations of Plato’s answer and 
Kant’s answer, assuming that the yardstick for accepting Plato’s answer and Kant’s 
answer is the persuasiveness of the accounts leading up to their answers for this thesis, I 
rejected both answers on whether a food dish can have an aesthetic value.  
My rejection of both answers means that, as of now and barring other thinkers’ 
answers to the question, whether a food dish can have an aesthetic value remains an open 
question.  
Section 1: Pitfalls that Any View on a Food Dish’s Aesthetic Value (if any) Should 
Avoid 
The rejection of Plato and Kant’s respective answers on whether a food dish can have an 
aesthetic value does not mean that their answers are philosophically worthless.  
From my criticisms of the accounts leading up to their answers for this thesis, we can 
discern a couple of pitfalls that any view on a food dish’s aesthetic value (if any) should 
avoid to be persuasive.78 By way of concluding this thesis, I briefly state these pitfalls. 
 
                                                 
78 This “any view on a food dish’s aesthetic value” may be a positive view or a negative view.   
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Section 1.1: The Pitfall of being Discriminative without Good Reason 
Derived from my criticisms of Plato’s most basic criterion for identifying a sense as 
either a higher sense or a lower sense in Chapter I’s Section 6.3, my criticisms of Plato’s 
tripartite model of the embodied soul in Chapter I’s Section 6.4, my criticisms of Kant’s 
view on the human senses in Chapter II’s Section 5.1, my criticisms of Kant’s First 
Argument for Universality in Chapter II’s Section 5.2, and my criticisms of Kant’s 
criterion for identifying aesthetic experiences in Chapter II’s Section 5.3, to be persuasive, 
a view on a food dish’s aesthetic value (if any) needs to avoid the pitfall of being 
discriminative without good reason. 
This means that the view should not, without giving any good reason, privilege a 
certain state of affairs over other states of affairs, and be biased against those other states 
of affairs. The same view should not mask a certain state of affairs, which can be attained 
via socialisation, as the “natural” and invariable state of affairs. 
Section 1.2: The Pitfall of being Exceptionless 
Deduced from my criticisms of Plato’s most basic criterion for identifying a sense as 
either a higher sense or a lower sense in Chapter I’s Section 6.3, my criticisms of Plato’s 
tripartite model of the embodied soul in Chapter I’s Section 6.4, my criticisms of Kant’s 
view on the human senses in Chapter II’s Section 5.1, my criticisms of Kant’s First 
Argument for Universality in Chapter II’s Section 5.2, and my criticisms of Kant’s 
criterion for identifying aesthetic experiences in Chapter II’s Section 5.3, to be persuasive, 
a view on a food dish’s aesthetic value (if any) needs to avoid the pitfall of being 
exceptionless. 
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This means that the view should not come without exceptions and qualifications. The 
same view should not mask a certain connection, which is not logically necessary, as the 
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